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ABSTRACT 
 
Farber, MaryKate     The Art Looting Investigation Unit: 
      Finding their place in World War II History 
 
 
 This thesis examines the work done by the Art Looting Investigation Unit (ALIU) 
during World War Two. The ALIU was created as a subdivision of the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), an American intelligence unit created during the war that was the 
predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency. The ALIU men sought to collect and 
build on information regarding the Nazi “art looting machine”. As such, they bore a 
strong resemblance to the activities of the Museum and Fine Arts and Archives (MFAA) 
commission (known as the “Monuments Men”). Thanks to a recent movie starting Matt 
Damon and George Clooney, the MFAA has become familiar to many Americans, and 
upon first examination, it appears that in comparison the ALIU had a much less exciting 
story.  
While the ALIU was not physically hunting art, they did the intelligence work 
that led to the apprehension and interrogations of major art dealers who had worked with 
Hitler. Though the majority of these men were able to go back to their trade following the 
war, the information collected by the ALIU assisted in the conviction of two major war 
criminals, Hermann Goering and Alfred Rosenberg. The ALIU was also able to 
undercover the major actions of the Linz organization (Hitler planned to build a museum 
to rival all other major European art centers in Linz Austria, this was where the majority 
of the looted art was going to be sent to following the end of the war) and bring the plans 
to light following the war. However, the longer-term impact would prove to be the 
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information gathered during the war that would assist in the creation of databases and 
organizations dedicated to returning looted art for decades after the war.   
 The investigation into this unit relied on the primary source documentation 
housed at the National Archive in College Park, Maryland. This collection was comprised 
of progress reports; financial records; the final reports distributed by the unit; and 
correspondence between the London and Washington branches of the ALIU. Because of 
the lack of secondary source material present at this time, the primary source was 
essential for this research. The day to day actions of the ALIU men was seen through 
their monthly reports and their long term accomplishments were tracked through their 
Consolidated and Detailed Interrogation Reports as well as the Final Report, which was 
written after the end of the war.  
 The importance of the ALIU lies in the documentation they collected and created 
during the war because it was able to track the actions of the major looting figures and 
brought to light the larger organizations present. This unit provided the link between the 
recovery being done by organizations such as the MFAA and the prosecution and 
reparation efforts following the war; without these men, the destruction of culture would 
not have been considered or proven to be a war crime. Their influence surpassed the 
expectations of those who created, because their influence can still be seen today in the 
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Chapter One: 
 
World War II is a period that has received great attention from students, as well as 
historians; it is a surprising that there are still untold stories hidden within this dramatic 
and exciting time period. History books teach students about the heroic efforts of the 
soldiers who stormed the beaches of Normandy; the men who witnessed the bombing of 
Pearl Harbor; and the exceptionally strong men women and children who survived to tell 
the tale of Hitler’s death camps. But there remain elements of World War Two that have 
been obscured by well-known events. It was not until recently that the story of 
“Monuments Men”, or the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (MFAA), was made 
familiar to the public. Robert Edsel is largely responsible for giving the much-deserved 
credit to the 350 men and women in the military unit who helped save Europe’s cultural 
treasures.1  
The MFAA, however, was not the only effort by the United States to hold 
accountable those responsible for the looting of European art and antiquities. The Art 
Looting Investigation Unit, or ALIU, was created to document the massive looting that 
occurred in Europe during World War Two. The MFAA almost always overshadows the 
ALIU and leaves them obscured in secondary source material. This is probably because 
the story of the MFAA men hunting down physical treasure is much more exciting to 
readers then the hunting down of information. When looking for the importance and 
impact of the ALIU, it can be concluded that their effect was much less immediate in 
comparison to the MFAA. The ALIU men worked to prepare documents that would be 
used by the Allied governments for decades. These documents not only worked to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robert Edsel, The Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi Thieves, and the Greatest Treasure Hunt in 
History (New York: Center Street, 2009), xiv. 
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prosecute major war criminals, they also laid the ground work for the creation of major 
databases and organizations that are still being used to find pieces of Nazi looted art and 
their original owners. Thus, the ALIU had a profound impact, even though the treasure-
hunting MFAA men so often get the focus.  
The MFAA was created after many prominent figures in the art world met at the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art on December 20th 1941 to discuss the fate of Europe’s 
cultural treasures and how the United States could protect them.2 In response, the MFAA 
was formed with the backing of President Roosevelt with the backing of the Roberts 
Commission;3 without this support, it is likely that the MFAA would have never been 
respected in the field.4 The MFAA men had no formal military training and asked to 
serve their country as best they could with the little information and supplies provided for 
them.5 In the end, the MFAA worked towards their mission from 1943 until 1951.6 The 
Allied troops worked to collect “church bells, stained glass, religious items, municipal 
records, manuscripts, books, libraries, wine, gold, diamonds and even insect collections”, 
the job of the MFAA was to travel through occupied Europe to pack, transport, catalogue, 
photograph, archive and return as much of this material as possible.7 
When Justice Owen J. Roberts created the program in 1944 as a branch of the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), it was decided that the mission was to be the 
following:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ibid, 18.  
3 The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War 
Areas, or Roberts Commission was housed in the National Gallery of Art and was comprised of a group of 
citizens who made plans to protect Europe’s cultural monuments.  
Greg, Bradsher. Michael Hussey, Michael Kurtz. “OSS Art Looting Investigation Unit Reports, 1945-46”, 
National Archives College Park Maryland. http://www.archives.gov/research/microfilm/m1782.pdf.  6-7.  
4 ibid, 53. 
5 ibid, 54 and 61. 
6 ibid, xiv. 
7 Ibid, 400. 
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It will be the primary mission of the Art Looting Investigation Unit to collect and 
disseminate such information bearing on the looting, confiscation and transfer of 
the enemy of art properties in Europe, and on individual organizations involved in 
such operations or transactions, as will be of direct aid to the United States 
agencies empowered to effect restitution of such properties and prosecution of 
war criminals.8 
 
This mission statement makes the differences between the two missions clear. The ALIU 
was focused on finding information while the MFAA men were hitchhiking around 
Europe trying to protect a piece of art before the enemy destroyed it. The MFAA men 
were in the middle of the action and their letters provide an emotional connection they 
had to the art they were trying to protect; this is what makes them appealing to readers 
and moviegoers. The ALIU men conducted meaningful fieldwork, it was brief and they 
saw little action. The bulk of their work was done in Altausse, Austria where they 
interrogated people either suspected of being a war criminal or individuals who could 
help shed light on the larger looting organization.  While the ALIU found important 
information during their investigations, the MFAA was finding massive amounts of 
hidden Nazi gold; they were also finding some of the greatest masterpieces of all time, 
thus their story has much more inherent appeal. Moreover, because there is so much 
overlap, it seems that scholars have a difficult time differentiating between the two 
groups. In practice, however, the two were quite distinct.   
 The MFAA itself gained attention during the 1990’s and 2000’s, however, there 
are some sources from the years immediately following the war. Janet Flanner’s book 
Men and Monuments: Profiles of Picasso, Matisse, Braque and Malraux from 1947 was 
the first major text to include a conversation about the “Monuments Men” and looting 
during World War Two; it was published just two years after the war ended. Flanner was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8Bradsher, 2-3.  
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an American writer who spent the majority of her career as a correspondent for the New 
Yorker magazine in Paris.9 Because Flanner wrote this book so soon after the war ended, 
she was able to lay the grounds for how this topic would be discussed in the future. As 
the title suggests, the major focus of Flanner’s work was to give attention to these major 
artists. However, there is an entire chapter titled “Beautiful Spoils” which deals directly 
with the war. In the beginning of the chapter, Flanner explains that Hitler began looting 
on an ideological ground.10 He was not taking works that he thought were the best but 
what he felt rightly belonged to Germany and that should be protected from the savage 
Allied troops.11 Hitler was choosing art that he felt represented the Arian race and was 
attempting to eliminate work done by degenerate artists or pieces of art that in someway 
contained degenerate ideas. This all derives from his idea that the art world needed to be 
purified of degenerate art; and he thought the best way of doing was through looting.12  
Since she was writing so immediately after the war, it can be ascertained that 
Flanner reflected in her book the popular opinion of the MFAA men during and after the 
war. In depictions such as Edsel’s, which are much more separated in the sense of time 
between the event and publishing of the book, it seems that the MFAA men were widely 
respected by their contemporaries (maybe not by the army but by the people at home who 
read about their adventures in the newspapers). Flanner, on the other hand discusses how 
initially they were seen as “obituary writers” whose only reports were “brief and 
melancholy”.13 It was not until the end of the war when the mines that had hidden the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “Janet Flanner”, last edited in 2015.  http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/209520/Janet-Flanner 
10 Janet Flanner, Men and Monuments: Profiles of Picasso, Matisse, Braque and Malraux (New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1947), 220-221. 
11 ibid, 221. 
12 ibid, 221. 
13 ibid, 273.  
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Nazi’s art and gold were discovered, that the MFAA began to gain some credit; Flanner 
was writing after these discoveries were made and likely represented the general opinion 
of the time. After the major discoveries, the story of the “Monuments Men” hit the front 
pages and they got a great deal of attention and respect. The discovery of “made art itself 
important”.14 James Rorimer, a former MFAA officer, released a book titled Survival in 
1950 shortly after Flanner’s book was released. This book contained the first hand 
account of Rorimer’s time working for the MFAA during the war. The depiction was 
very similar to the one told by Flanner.  
Flanner argued that the major job of the MFAA, as seen by contemporary 
governments and organizations, was to act as an unofficial “lost and found”.15 This idea 
stems from the fact that when the European people saw war as inevitable, they began to 
send their personal treasures to the countryside in an effort to protect them. When the war 
ended, they tried to return to reclaim their treasures and often found that they were no 
longer there. It is likely that the items they had sent to be kept safe in the country had 
ended up being looted by German forces as they were tearing through Europe. When this 
happened, they would turn to the MFAA men for assistance; it does not seem that Flanner 
saw this as their most important job, but one that took much of their time.16 When 
Flanner wrote this book, the war had just ended; she was not able to see the larger impact 
that the activates of the MFAA would have on the process of restitution and conviction of 
war criminals. Flanner does explain the other tasks given to the men. She states that they 
were told to repair art, prevent improper billeting, and to inspect and report on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 ibid, 278. 
15 ibid, 271, 
16 ibid, 272. 
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condition of art and monuments.17 This is an important aspect to the job of the MFAA 
men but there is much more detail that later historians work through.  
After these two books were written, the topic of the MFAA was largely 
overlooked until the 1980’s when Michael Kurtz published his book, America and the 
Return of Nazi Contraband. This book is a more straightforward academic treatment that 
gives the reader historical context of looting that occurred before World War Two and the 
efforts that have been taken in the past to combat it. This book was first published in 
1985 and then revised and updated and rereleased in 2006. Kurtz discusses the Nazi 
looting as well as the Allies’ restitution efforts; he then looks at the result of the 
restitution work and how it translated to later conflicts, such as the Cold War. Due to his 
position as an Assistant Archivist for Records Services in Washington D.C., Kurtz was 
motivated by his desire to give the world a more complete understanding of what led to 
the massive looting by the Nazis, and how Allied governments dealt with it. As Kurtz 
explains in his introduction, “through the prism of plunder and restitution, we enter the 
darkest period of the most violent and bloody century in human history.”18 By giving 
historical context to the Nazi looting, Kurtz is able to show why the efforts of the MFAA 
were so important and so unique, and while celebrating the men, he neither romanticizes 
nor downplays their effort. Kurtz shows the obstacles that were faced by the men and 
how they overcame them.  
The fact Kurtz released his book twice leads to the question of what changed 
during that time period, and why he felt it was necessary to rerelease the book? Kurtz 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 ibid, 268. 
Billeting refers to the idea that members of the military were provided with board and lodging in private 
homes. Thus, improper billeting meant that the military personnel would occupy historic buildings that 
were on the target list for the MFAA to protect.  
18 Kurtz, x. 
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explained that he “honestly believed that the story of cultural restoration after World War 
II and America’s role in it was pretty much a settled story, a part of the past,” when he 
wrote the first edition of the book.19 The increase of materials and interest in the subject, 
between the 1980’s and 2000’s, came largely from the entrance of many restitution cases 
into the United States courtrooms.20 As major figures in World War II looting began to 
die, their art resurfaced mostly on the black market. Both moral and legal issues have 
been brought up when dealing with restitution and how the American courts should deal 
with these pieces of art. As Kurtz says, “new information, new perspectives, and 
unfolding courtroom dramas provide the necessity for revisiting America’s role in the 
saga of cultural restitution.”21 By revisiting the subject, Americans can be reminded of 
the truly horrible acts committed by the Nazis and that those acts are what brought the art 
to these individuals.  
Lynn Nicholas’ book The Rape of Europa: The Face of Europe’s Treasures in the 
Third Reich and the Second World War deals with many of the same issues as previous 
authors and likely informed Kurtz’s revision. This book was published in 1995; years 
before Robert Edsel’s famous book was released. When one picks this book up off the 
shelf in bookstores today they see a sticker on the front with a type of disclaimer; it reads 
“The real story behind the Major Motion Picture The Monuments Men”. This first 
impression is important because it shows the reader that this book often falls into the 
shadows of works that came after. Unlike Edsel’s book, this is not a depiction of a 
historical period as an adventure story. Nicholas initially discusses in depth, the initial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Michael Kurtz, America and the Return of Nazi Contraband: The Recovery of Europe’s Cultural 
Treasures (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), ix. 
20 ibid, ix.  
21 ibid, ix. 
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stages of the Nazi looting machine. She then goes into the search, recovery and restitution 
of the art. Nicholas brings the reader across all of Occupied Europe to follow both the art 
and the men who were trying to save it. Unlike Edsel, she is not tied to only being able to 
follow the MFAA men and their actions.   
Nicholas’ book stands out in comparison to many other historical texts dealing 
with this period because she uses such a critical lens. She shows the power struggles and 
the failure of the initial staff that was brought together to create the program. By allowing 
the reader to see the many obstacles that the MFAA men had to overcome, their story 
becomes much more impressive. The MFAA men traveled on both sides of the line (in 
both Allied and enemy territory) throughout the war in response to reports of damage and 
looting by the enemy.22 However, they not only have to catalogue what was damaged and 
destroyed, they also had to keep detailed notes on what had gone missing.23 One of the 
officers wrote, “It is still not possible to ascertain what was hidden by…collectors before 
and during the German occupation, what the Germans destroyed in contradistinction to 
what they carried away…what was moved from one house to another by the Germans 
and what has just been mislaid during the period of disorder.”24 This quotation shows the 
chaos that the MFAA men were being faced with. The men were doing everything they 
could with situations that were not ideal.  
Nicholas rounds out her discussion of the MFAA by discussing the work they did 
once the war was over. It was decided that works of art would only be returned to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe’s Treasures in the Third Reich and the 
Second World War (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 304 
23 ibid, 308. 
24 Ibid, 308.  
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governments of Allied nations, which could establish claim to those pieces.25 The ability 
to lay claim to these works of art largely came from the investigations done by the 
MFAA. This was necessary, because during this period, every Allied nation was looking 
to get a percentage of Germany’s wealth through reparations; the amount of money that 
each country would receive would be determined by the value and amount of artwork 
they were given back.26 The discussion of the time following Germany’s surrender gives 
the reader the final pieces of the very confusing puzzle. Nicholas shows the great 
triumphs for the “Monuments Men”, but also shows where they had problems; this 
creates a very balanced and fair account of the time period.   
Robert Edsel’s book Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi Thieves, and the 
Greatest Treasure Hunt in History, is arguably the best known text dealing with the 
looting and recovery of art during World War II. This book was written by Edsel, who is 
not an academic historian, in 2009 during the resurgence in the interest of both World 
War II and the “Monuments Men”. Robert Edsel’s personal history is important to note, 
because it varies greatly from the other authors dealing with this period. Edsel is the 
founder of the Monuments Men Foundation for the Preservation of Art. The mission 
statement of this foundation explains that it: 
Honors the legacy of the men and women who served in the Monuments, Fine 
Arts, and Archives section…and their unprecedented and heroic work protecting 
and safeguarding civilization’s most important artistic and cultural treasures from 
armed conflict during World War II. Raising public awareness is essential to the 
Foundation’s mission.27  
 
This statement shows the intense personal passion that Edsel feels for the topic. This 
interest began when Edsel was living in Florence; here he began to question how the art 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 ibid, 383. 
26 ibid, 383. 
27 “The Monuments Men Foundation”. Last modified in 2014. http://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/ 
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was protected against the Nazi looting machine.28 Between 2000 and 2004, Edsel 
continually increase his devotion to this question, until in 2004 he made it his full time 
career. Sharing what these men accomplished has become Edsel’s life work; this is clear 
when reading his books. He lives for these men and holds them up as heroes, and because 
of this his work is clearly celebratory.   
The story of the “Monuments Men” is a dramatic and exciting one; this combined 
with Edsel’s personal connection to the topic creates a breathtaking depiction of the 
historical period. The unusual cast of characters that made up the MFAA unit provides 
the perfect characters for this adventure story. These men were from very different 
backgrounds then those who typically are on the front line of war; the group represents 
the juxtaposition between the academic world and the world of combat. Edsel takes some 
creative license when writing the dialogue between the characters, but he also 
incorporates personal letters and documents written by the MFAA men. These elements 
all make the story seem like a fictional treasure hunt; however, the characters that 
brought the readers to the frontline were all real and the events were, for the most part, 
accurately depicted.  
When dealing with the protection and restitution efforts during the war, all of the 
previously mentioned authors largely focused on the MFAA; the Art Looting 
Investigation Unit (ALIU), who was also extremely active in Europe during this period, 
is only briefly mentioned. Why this is, is unclear. The ALIU was a much smaller program 
than the MFAA and both programs worked to gather as much intelligence as possible for 
both the people searching for art but also for the trials that would follow the war. Instead 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 “Robert Edsel”. Last modified, October 29th 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_M._Edsel 
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of trying to hunt down the works of art themselves, the ALIU worked to investigate and 
interrogate individuals that would shed light on the larger organization. It seems that 
because the story of these men was not as dramatic as the exiting lives of the treasure-
hunting MFAA men, they often fall out of the spotlight. The ALIU men worked to create 
detailed documents that would later prove invaluable when trying to persecute the war 
criminals during the Nuremberg Trials.  
Many of the former ALIU members wrote about their time in Europe during 
World War II. James S. Plaut, one of the ALIU men, wrote a short piece titled, 
“Investigation of the Major Nazi Art-Confiscation Agencies”, which has now been 
published in Elizabeth Simpson’s The Spoils of War. In this article he outlines the two 
major goals of the ALIU mission: to provide intelligence for the MFAA mission, and to 
provide evidence for the trials that would follow the war.29 He also shows the major 
difference between the work of the MFAA and the ALIU: the MFAA was more focused 
on rounding up the art and the people who stole it, while the ALIU was focused on 
getting confessions and building cases.30 Once the war ended, Plaut discusses how the 
ALIU set up a headquarters at Altausse, and from June of 1945 until the spring of 1946 
they searched for and questioned Germans who were in one way or another involved in 
the looting operations.31  
S. Lane Faison Jr. also wrote a short piece for Simpson’s Spoils of War, titled 
“Transfer of Custody to the Germans”. Compared to Plaut’s account of the war, this one 
was much more technical. Instead of discussing the ALIU as a group, Faison explained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Elizabeth Simpson, Spoils of War: World War II and Its Aftermath. (New York: H.N. Abrams, 
1997),124. 
30 ibid, 124. 
31 ibid, 124. 
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his role at the Munich Central Collecting Point (CCP). In 1950, it was decided that the 
United States would no longer participate in U.S. occupied zones for art reparation for 
both Germany and Austria.32 Faison was sent to Wiesbaden, which was one of the major 
Central Collecting Points. He continued to review and return works that had been taken 
during the war.33 The majority of the works that he dealt with came from the Altausse salt 
mine, which was one of the major locations in which the ALIU worked.34 The accounts 
written by former ALIU men were, for a long time, the only pieces of documentation and 
publication of their work. Through their accounts, reader is able to understand what it 
was like for an academic to be on the frontline of the war. Like Edsel’s and Rorimer’s 
books, it is important to remember that these are not necessarily scholarly secondary 
sources; because they participated in the war, their opinions may be clouded slightly.  
In Flanner’s chapter dealing with the MFAA, she included a brief discussion of 
the ALIU. When she first mentions the work of Theodore Rousseau, James Plaut and S. 
L. Faison (the three ALIU men who worked in the field), she refers to them as a “roving 
secret service”.35 This seems like the perfect way to describe the work of the ALIU, and it 
is interesting that it was phrased this way so soon after the war because in Edsel’s 
interpretation of the unit, it seems as if there was very little understanding of what the 
unit actually did. Flanner is clear in stating that the MFAA and ALIU were two separate 
organizations but does mention that there was only one Monuments man who was a full 
time detective who did similar work to the ALIU men; that was Walter Horn who worked 
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for the MFAA but supplemented the work being done by the ALIU.36 This is the only 
moment when the tasks between the ALIU and the MFAA seem to be interconnected in 
Flanner’s discussion of the topic. The lack of elaboration on the topic was not surprising; 
when Flanner wrote this chapter, the majority of the documentation from the unit was 
still classified because of the Nuremberg Trials.  
 Michael Kurtz does not talk about the ALIU at length but he does mention the 
organization and the men who were involved. When introducing the ALIU, Kurtz 
describes it as a “small art-looting investigation unit”.37 He then goes on to explain their 
close connection to the MFAA and that there was open communication and sharing of 
information between the two branches.38 Kurtz included men such as Taylor (who 
worked to create the ALIU) in earlier discussion of how the MFAA was originally 
formed. It is important to note that Kurtz’s book was not a study on one specific group, 
but instead gave a complete history of what happened before World War II, what 
happened during the war and what happened after; he was not focused on individuals or 
groups but on the larger picture and overarching themes. It can be assumed that Kurtz 
was not attempting to down play the importance of the ALIU but was forced minimize 
the discussion because of the amount of material he set out to cover.  
Lynn Nicholas gives the ALIU much more credit for their work and explains the 
program more fully than Kurtz. She explains that the goal of the ALIU was to trace and 
“prevent the flow of assets to places of refuge where they might be used to finance the 
postwar survival of Nazism”.39 Their major role in the war was, like the other historians 
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have said, to compile information that would help with the prosecution of Nazis after the 
war was completed. 40 Like Flanner, she clearly states that the MFAA and ALIU were 
two completely separate entities; the ALIU was not controlled by the Roberts 
Commission and was to work under the OSS.41 They were technically listed under the 
armed forces but they were given permission to move through military and neutral zones 
in order to complete their mission.42 Nicholas seems to give the best representation (up to 
that point) of the unit and the men who worked for it. She explains their position fully 
and explains the role of the three ALIU men who worked in the field.  
Edsel, and the organization he oversees, has rolled the ALIU into the broader 
category of the “Monuments Men”. Each of the ALIU men have been included on the 
Monuments Men Foundation website. This is just one of the many examples of the ALIU 
being absorbed under the umbrella term of “Monuments Men”. The reason this stands out 
is because Robert Edsel mentions the ALIU man once in The Monuments Men. In the 
“Author’s Note” Edsel mentions an anecdote of going to visit S. Lane Faison Jr. who was 
a key member of the ALIU. Edsel gives a brief biographical look at Faison but the main 
purpose of the addition is to discuss the feeling when you speak to the men who were on 
the ground. He speaks about how the two of them met for three hours, and then Faison 
died just ten days later.43 This short story has little insight into Faison and fails to 
mention the ALIU and the importance of the unit.  
In the initial chapters of his book, Edsel does speak briefly of Francis Taylor, who 
was one of the key figures in the creation of the ALIU; but the ALIU itself is not 
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mentioned. Taylor is referred to as the “maker of big schemes” in regards to his time 
working on planning with the Roberts Commission.44 Faison is mentioned again briefly 
when Edsel quotes him saying if people had read Hitler’s book Mein Kamph, they would 
have realized that “every single thing that’s happened was already predicted…the whole 
Jewish situation is there in clear writing in ink”.45 As with Taylor, there is no reference to 
Faison’s connection to the ALIU or the OSS, Taylor is simply one of the men who 
worked for the organization. It is possible that Edsel intentionally left the ALIU out of the 
story to avoid the mention of another important group because of it would complicate 
matters and he was already to tackling so much information. Another possibility is that 
Edsel simply did not see the work of the ALIU as significant in comparison to the 
MFAA. He included the men when it was convenient for his story line but that was the 
extent of it. 
 There is one source that is dedicated solely to the ALIU, its creation and its 
impact; that is Michael Salter’s book US Intelligence, the Holocaust and the Nuremberg 
Trials: Seeking Accountability for Genocide and Cultural Plunder; this book is a volume 
that is a part of a larger collection, which has been titled History of International 
Relations, Diplomacy and Intelligence. Salter’s book looks at the achievements and 
frustrations of the creation of the ALIU and the men who worked to create it. This is a 
unique source because its only goal is to discuss the ALIU and thus much more detail is 
given to the topic; and when the MFAA is mentioned, it is done so in a way that supports 
an argument being made about the ALIU. Salter does not tell a dramatic story about the 
ALIU but instead presents the historical facts and presents the reasons why they should 	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be celebrated as a part of World War Two history. In his introduction, Salter states that 
the reason for the writing of this book was largely the recent declassification of 
intelligence files regarding the ALIU, but was also intended to provide a detailed case 
study of the Nazis who did the looting and the actions of the ALIU to bring them to 
justice.46 He creates a complete summary of the program through using many of the 
authors previously discussed as well as the archives at College Park in Maryland. While 
this source is not as exciting as the one written by Edsel, it is important because it tells 
the story that was previously only present in primary documents hidden away in the 
archives.  
 These texts are representative of how the ALIU is generally presented in histories 
about this period. Some of the information available regarding the ALIU is from 
individuals who have taken a personal interest in the program and written online, or from 
oral histories collected before the death of the major ALIU men; but in order to get a well 
rounded impression of the program, a close study of the primary sources is required. 
There are publications written by the ALIU men from after their time in the war, but they 
very rarely discuss their experience. These men are after all scholars and that is what they 
return to following the war.  Overall there is very little secondary source material 
detailing the actions of the ALIU. The primary source material that is available to the 
public tells an exciting and important story, but it is not taken advantage of. 
In order to find the importance of the work accomplished by the ALIU, it is necessary for 
one to look at the documents housed at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. 
While there are archives that hold the personal papers of the ALIU men, the National 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Michael Salter, U.S. Intelligence, the Holocaust and the Nuremberg Trials: Seeking Accountability for 
Genocide and Cultural Plunder (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff: 2009), 310-311. 
	   20	  
Archive holds all of the organization’s official paperwork and documentation, which 
included financial documents, monthly reports, correspondence between the two main 
ALIU offices, correspondence with other Allied organizations and the four major 
publications produced by the ALIU. The three of the four reports were available in 
microfilm but the fourth, and smallest, was included in the physical collection. The four 
reports that were produced by the ALIU are as follows: the Consolidated Interrogation 
Reports, the Detailed Interrogation Reports, the Final Report and the report regarding the 
Final Mission to Europe. Missing from this collection are letters and personal documents 
generated by the ALIU members, which could likely be found in the possession of the 
families of the ALIU men or in the archives of institutions that they were associate with 
during their lifetimes. Through this research, the impact of the ALIU men on the history 
of World War Two could be explored and their long-term impacts towards restitution 
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Chapter Two: 
The Art Looting Investigative Unit (ALIU) was created to aid the larger art 
protection and art recovery missions already in place throughout Europe during World 
War Two. The purpose of this unit was to provide intelligence-gathering services, which 
would help other agencies uncover the art looting patterns of the Germans. They 
successfully apprehended and interrogated suspects, but their true influence was not 
present until after the war. To combat the problem of Nazi looting the Roberts 
Commission gathered a group of civilians in 1942 under the common fear that the 
cultural monuments in Europe were going to be destroyed.1 Through the support of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the “American Commission For the Protection and 
Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas” or “Roberts Commission” 
was created. The Commission was housed in the National Gallery of Art in Washington 
DC and worked in cooperation with the U.S. Army to accomplish its goals.2 The Roberts 
Commission did not directly oversee the various projects, but instead developed the 
ideology and collected individual to create programs such as the Monuments, Fine Arts 
and Archives (MFAA) and later the Art Looting Investigation Unit (ALIU).3 
In 1944, Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts approached William J. Donovan, 
director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), with the request to create a special 
intelligence unit that would deal with art looting and build on the work already being 
done by the MFAA; Roberts hoped that this office would be formed and administered 
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under the OSS.4 The OSS was created on June 13, 1942 as a successor to the Office of 
the Coordinator of Information and a predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency.5 
When it was created, the major goals outlined for the OSS were to collect, analyze and 
disseminate information regarding the German art looting operations, which could have 
an impact on the United States’ national security.6 It is likely that Donovan approved the 
ALIU to be apart of the OSS partially because he saw that this unit could assist the X-2’s 
mission. Donovan created the X-2 branch of the OSS in 1943 with the intention of 
providing the British Intelligence service with liaisons from the OSS office.7 The X-2 
was given its own overseas station, and communication channels and operated alongside 
the British foreign and domestic intelligence services.8 This branch of the OSS was 
known to be the most effective branch because the quality of its operatives.9 The goals of 
the ALIU would work to help the X-2 mission of tracking the movement of Nazi 
operatives who were concealing assets.10  
The Roberts Commission pursued the creation of the ALIU under the OSS for one 
very specific reason: they felt that the unit could provide useful intelligence information 
that they were not able to get elsewhere.11 While they had a powerful role in its creation, 
the Roberts Commission did not have any direct power over the ALIU after it was 
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formed.12 The personnel operating in the field were not to act as representatives for the 
Roberts Commission and were expected to be under the cover of G-2 or G-5 (G-2 and G-
5 refer to US Army military intelligence divisions) or other government agencies.13 
Before being allowed to enter the field, all ALIU members, were required to receive basic 
OSS indoctrination as well as general X-2 and specialized ORION instruction.14 Even 
though the ALIU men had already been enlisted in the war effort, they were required to 
complete the specialized training.  
The ALIU was officially established in November of 1944 and given the code 
name ORION.15 The guidelines given to the program by the OSS point clearly to the fact 
that the ALIU was an investigative and intelligence gathering unit; unlike the MFAA, 
they were not an agency that revolved around action.16 The unit’s mission did not include 
identification or protection of art.17 As a result, the impact made by the ALIU was much 
less tangible; they recovered information that is likely still being used today but are 
viewed as less important when compared to the MFAA because they were not uncovering 
stolen treasures. The information found by the unit was to be used to provide the 
necessary information to complete the restitution project after the war.  
The ALIU agents themselves were not involved in the restitution, however, the 
information they collected was. In the directive for the program, it was outlined as 
follows: 
The primary mission of ORION was to collect and disseminate such information 
bearing on the looking, confiscation and transfer by the enemy of art properties in 	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Europe, and on individuals or organizations involved in such operations and 
transactions, as will be of direct aid to the United States agencies empowered to 
effect restitution of such properties and prosecution of war criminals. It is 
anticipated that, coincident with the execution of its primary mission, ORION will 
obtain substantial information bearing on enemy espionage and on subversive 
individuals and activities.18 
 
This statement clearly defines the ALIU as a unit that was created to solely investigative. 
The code name ORION was given to the project because of the hunting aspect of their 
work. Like the ancient warrior Orion, the ALIU men hunted throughout Europe to find 
information and individuals.19 When first studying this unit, it can be assumed that since 
the ALIU was a part of the OSS they were a covert operation. However, during the war, 
the cartoonist, Crockett Johnson, created an image (attachment 1) in which “J.P. ORION” 
is referred to as the “mightiest hunter of them all.”  The presence of this cartoon suggests 
that the operation was not covert and that the general public was aware of it.  
The ALIU was instructed but its creators to collect information from other 
organizations and shared what they felt was appropriate. They were to look both at the 
enemy looting activity on the whole but also at individuals who had a stake in the action. 
They were not interested in finding where the art was hidden; this was the mission of the 
MFAA men. The ALIU men entered Europe after the MFAA men had already spent time 
working there. With their specific mission, the ALIU took information gathered by the 
MFAA men that they saw as useful and furthered their investigation. The only form of 
action the ALIU men were meant to take was to interrogate individuals who were given 
the highest priority by the Washington office. When the ALIU was being created, James 
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Plaut, the director of the program, explicitly stated that the information collected would 
be analyzed with restitution and prosecution of war criminals in mind.20  
 When looking at the goals of the ALIU, some confusion can arise. In the 
directive, it is clear that dissemination and recovery of information is key to the mission. 
So how does restitution fit into this? The ALIU men were not personally responsible for 
the restitution of art following the war. The information that the ALIU men sought to 
gather would have a great effect on the efficiency and accuracy of the restitution effort 
following the war. As Rothfeld explains:  
The ALIU acted as a ‘bridge’ between the art community’s (Roberts 
Commission) interests of recovering and restituting looted artworks and the 
intelligence community’s interest in finding German agents acting as art dealers 
and tracing the movement of hidden Nazi assets. The story of the ALIU was one 
of bringing together two agencies with different needs and their increasingly 
shared concerns with the movement and fate of Nazi looted assets.21  
 
By looking at the important German figures involved in looting and how they operated, 
the ALIU hoped to gain more insight on the operation as a whole. Going into this project, 
the ALIU operatives knew that the enemy and their methods were what should be 
investigated first. The “looting machine” was a powerful and complex one that took 
months of recovery and investigation to more fully understand.  
Even with the dissemination of information at the core of the ALIU mission, the 
evaluation of the information from the standpoint of restitution and persecution was to 
always take precedence. Because of this very specific directive, the success of this 
program was not to be measured by the volume of intelligence gathered.22 Instead, the 
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ALIU would be judged by its ability to provide ample information that would help bring 
the stolen art back to its rightful owners in addition to the ability to put the criminals who 
stole the art behind bars. They worked side by side with other agencies in the field and 
worked to complete the tasks of other agencies that weren’t successful or were not as 
effective as the ALIU proved to be. It is likely that the general public was not aware of 
the volume of information being collected by the ALIU; until the organizations 
documents were declassified it can be assumed that very few people knew the extent of 
the work that was accomplished by these men.  
The ALIU was made up of six members of the United States armed forces; these 
men were qualified for this position due to their civilian experience in art museums and 
universities.23 In comparison, by the end of the war, the MFAA was comprised of three 
hundred and fifty men and women who worked towards their mission from 1943 until 
1951.24 Initially it seemed that recruiting properly trained personnel would pose a 
problem when developing the ALIU; not only did the men have to be capable to conduct 
intelligence work, they also had to have a strong art background and be linguistically 
qualified.25 To support the art historians working in the field, a second group was chosen 
for their strong analytical and clerical skills; they were not required to have an art 
historical background.26 The structure of the various headquarters and members of the 
ALIU can become confusing. Attachment 2 shows the structure in a much more 
simplified manner. Despite the small size of the unit, the ALIU was both effective and 
efficient in its mission; this becomes clear through the examination of their records and 
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documents from this period. The ALIU provided ample documentation of their 
discoveries that were used by the Allied governments, as well as the Untied States 
government, to return looted art to its rightful owners long after the war ended.   
Lieutenants James S. Plaut and Theodore Rousseau Jr. were the first men to be 
assigned to the ALIU. Plaut, who was chosen to be the director of the program, received 
his B.A. in Art History from Harvard University.27 In 1935 he moved from teaching at 
Harvard to becoming an assistant curator at the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, and then 
the Institute of Modern Art in Boston in 1939.28 Plaut entered the U.S. Navy and was 
assigned to North Africa in 1942.29 Before leaving, he was worked with the OSS officials 
to create an initial plan of operation for the ALIU project.30 The report from this time 
period shows that the ranks and responsibilities of the members of the ALIU was still 
being decided Rousseau, like Plaut, received his education in Art History from Harvard 
University.31 Rousseau then went on to become the assistant curator of painting at the 
National Gallery of Art in Washington D.C.32 When the war began in Europe, Rousseau 
joined the Navy and served in Naval Intelligence before being transferred to the ALIU.33 
Once both men completed their specific OSS training, they were asked to travel through 
Europe to establish contacts at various field stations, and to brief the X-2 personnel on the 
specifics of the ALIU program.34 
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While the members were being selected for the unit, the headquarters was 
established in Washington D.C.35 Charles Sawyer was chosen to lead the Washington 
office and to make decisions regarding the policies of the program.36 Sawyer received his 
degree from Yale University and was on the track to become a lawyer until Paul Sachs, 
associate director of the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard University, convinced him to 
attend the Harvard School of Fine Arts.37 Paul Sachs went on to work with the Roberts 
Commission and other men to create the MFAA who would later work to create the 
ALIU and a recruiter for the MFAA.38 He was a strong believer in the need for units to 
protect and return artistic and cultural treasures that had been looted during the war.39 
After completing his education, Sawyer became an art instructor and chairman of the Art 
Department of Phillips Academy when he took leave to serve in the U.S. Army.40 In his 
book, Robert Edsel mentions Sawyer’s attendance at the September 20, 1941 meeting in 
the New York where the first steps were made towards the creation of what would 
become the MFAA.41  
Before being chosen for the ALIU, Sawyer spent about six months largely 
unassigned until he was placed with the MFAA unit in May of 1944.42 Just a few months 
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later he was transferred to the ALIU where he was given the task of running the 
Washington office.43 Sawyer was mainly responsible for creating travel plans for the unit, 
providing appropriate cover arrangements, and making sure the officers had the proper 
funds and equipment available in the field.44 As explained in an analysis of the program, 
the information would first be sent to the London office and then passed along to the 
Washington offices, where they could be fully translated and prepared for 
dissemination.45  
John Phillips was chosen to be the head of the ALIU operation in London. 
Phillips had an educational background in American silver and was also a director of the 
Yale Art Gallery.46 Before joining the ALIU, he was stationed in Boston at the Army 
Counter Intelligence office.47  On January 31st, 1945 he wrote to Sawyer that the “art 
desk” was officially established; in these documents the term “art desk” is often used and 
refers to ALIU offices in both Washington D.C. and London. The London office was 
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the unit.  
Since there were ALIU operatives traveling through Europe and headquarters in 
both England and the United States, the organization had to develop an effective way to 
facilitate communication; the solution was to create bi-weekly progress reports that 
would include updates from the men in the field but also what was being done at the two 
offices. Their activity is well documented from January 1945 until November 1945; any 
activity after this point was either included in one of the final reports or submitted 
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independently. While they were brief, these reports are useful in providing exact dates for 
the various events that occurred while the men were traveling to and throughout Europe. 
Rousseau left Washington before Plaut on January 18th.48 Plaut left the Washington D.C. 
office on January 30th, 1945.49  
In many ways, the ALIU provided the service of tying up the loose ends left from 
other Allied intelligence agencies in Europe. Before the ALIU was established, various 
Allied governments had attempted to set up departments who would focus on 
documenting the art that was looted and attempt to discover who was responsible for 
taking it. Based on the frequency of their interactions, the organization that appears to be 
the most helpful to the ALIU men was the Commission for the Protection and Restitution 
of Cultural Material, or the Vaucher Commission, which was made up of French, 
Belgian, Dutch, Polish, Czech and English representatives.50 The Commission had tried 
to develop a program with similar goals to the ALIU, but was never able to fully adapt to 
the conditions and problems they were faced with. By meeting regularly, Phillips and the 
other ALIU members were able to understand successes and shortcomings of Vaucher 
Commission’s.  
 The documents created by the Vaucher Commission were made available to the 
ALIU men, and thus they were able to continue their work in a more effective and 
unbiased fashion.51 The Commission had been working to compile cards containing 
information on German art personnel, which were active in occupied areas.52 A problem 	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that was outlined in a report from January 1945 was that some of the information in these 
cards was presented in a fashion that established guilt instead of focusing on objective 
facts.53 That is not to say these cards were not valuable, but the ALIU men were able to 
provide a more objective standpoint. The Vaucher Commission representatives who 
wrote these cards had seen first hand the art being stolen from their home country and 
had experienced the pain that goes along with living in a war torn nation; the ALIU men 
were able to avoid the majority of this bias because of the fact that it was not their 
country that had been ransacked by the Germans.  
Due to the small size of the ALIU, it was necessary to maintain close contact with 
other organizations that were either interested in preservation of art or groups who were 
also a part of the war effort. One of the most important functions of the Washington 
ALIU office was to maintain good relationships with liaisons from other government 
agencies. Plaut stated in January of 1945 that he expected the effectiveness of the ALIU 
to be based on how quickly information could be transmitted between agencies as well as 
continents.54 On the American side of the program, it was essential for the ALIU to be in 
contact with the War Department, the State Department, the Foreign Economic Agency 
(FEA) and the Roberts Commission.55 In London, the ALIU was interested in 
collaborating with the M.I.6, the Ministry of Economic Welfare (MEW) and London 
representatives of the French, Dutch, Belgian, Czech and Polish respective art looting 
related organizations.56  
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These groups viewed the ALIU as a central location where all of the Allied 
intelligence regarding enemy looting could be collected;57 the OSS referred to the ALIU 
as a “Cultural War Room”.58 This statement shows the importance placed on the ALIU; 
they were highly respected through all Allied territory and were able to get much 
accomplished in a short amount of time.59 This opinion of the ALIU remained though out 
its existence. They were looked to as experts on Nazi looting; especially in regards to the 
larger organizations they studied and compiled reports on. It appears that they were not 
seen as less important than the MFAA; instead it was acknowledged that their purpose 
was very different. This efficiency of the ALIU program seems to be largely due to the 
positive relationships with other agencies as well as the fact that they made their mission 
known, through lecture and sharing of documents. It appears that in comparison to the 
MFAA, the ALIU was more universally known throughout the branches of the army. 
Along with the gathering of information, the dissemination of information was central to 
the mission of the ALIU; this task almost always took precedence.60  
The ALIU was housed under the OSS, which meant that the men were able to 
move freely through militarized as well as neutral zones; this was a rare privilege and 
thus a great advantage.61 While the MFAA men were allowed the freedom to move 
throughout Europe, they were given “no vehicles, no offices, no support staff, and no 
backup plan”.62 It was clear to the leaders of the MFAA that the men in the field would 
have to fight for their own respect and use their passion and flexibility to be successful in 
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their mission.63 When the MFAA entered the field, military personnel were not convinced 
that their mission was necessary or even a good idea; this contrasts with the ALIU who 
came in towards the end of the war when it was clear that the work to investigate looting 
was necessary for the reparation process but also for the prosecution of war criminals.64 
By being able to see what organizations had done before them, the ALIU was able to 
carefully look at what had been done in the past and develop ways to be more successful 
in their own mission.  
The importance of transparency of the unit’s goals once again becomes apparent 
when it is mentioned that Plaut lectured to a group of prospective X-2 field 
representatives on the problems that were anticipated to face by the ALIU.65 By sharing 
the mission of the ALIU men and the problems they faced, it seems that it would be more 
likely that the X-2 operatives would offer their assistance when needed. Initially, it was 
assumed that because the ALIU was created as a branch of the OSS, that it would be a 
covert operation; this obviously was not the case. While the MFAA program was also not 
a covert organization, their mission was not effectively shared throughout the branches of 
the United States Army and Navy. Not only did they not know about the program, those 
who did, as Edsel explains, probably would not have put up with the program if it had 
been formed without Roosevelt’s backing.66 Because of this, the MFAA men were often 
forced to find their own forms of transportation and soldiers often questioned their 
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credentials.67 It is likely that the ALIU saw these problems and worked to create 
relationships that would allow for a more seamless operation to be conducted.  
Even though Plaut had created a plan of operation for the ALIU before leaving the 
United States, work was still being done to decide the future of the program in late 
February.68 The ALIU was constantly learning what methods were successful for running 
their operations and which were not. This meant that during the early months of the 
program, the men were continually changing and developing their plans. At this point the 
locations in which the men would focus their efforts had yet to be decided; restitution and 
the protection of art needed to happen in all corners of the European Theatre, so the 
ALIU had technically had no boundaries.  
Due to the lack of physical boundaries, the ALIU men were able to follow a 
suspect from country to country. They would then report the information back to the 
appropriate nation. By the end of the war they had traveled to almost every European 
nation that was involved in World War Two. When he entered the European Theatre, 
Rousseau went directly to Portugal and Spain where he studied the effect of German 
looting on the Iberian Peninsula from January until May of 1945.69 While Spain and 
Portugal were both neutral countries during the war, Rousseau was investigating possible 
German-owned property being held in these countries.70 This investigation brought to 
light the actions of Alois Miedl, who was the financial agent for Goering and was 
mentioned throughout the second Consolidated Interrogation Report.71 While no Detailed 	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Interrogation Report was written about Miedl, there was a document that was distributed 
by the ALIU in February of 1945 that detailed to findings of Rousseau during his time in 
the Iberian Peninsula.72 The work done by Rousseau later became the keystone in the 
later investigation into the German art looting in Holland.73  
While Rousseau focused mainly on the Iberian Peninsula, Plaut was active in Italy 
during March of 1945.74 He was in Italy to supervise the interrogation of Wilhelm 
Mohnen, who was a German espionage agent as well as a minor player in the German art 
looting activities in France.75 The MFAA took over the majority of the work in Italy and 
for the rest of the war Plaut acted as a consultant and received the information that would 
prove useful to the ALIU investigations.76 After returning from Italy, Plaut met with 
Professor Thomas Whittemore, who was a long time resident of Istanbul.77 He was able 
to give the men an idea of the condition of art and artifacts in the East and the effect of 
German looting; the ALIU men were particularly interested in the possibility of an 
operation in Turkey, but this never was put into action.78 
By possessing a clear and concise definition of their mission, the ALIU was not 
being distracted by multiple goals. They were sent into the field to collect information 
strictly regarding art looting war criminals and information that would aid in the 
restitution process. In comparison, the MFAA was sent into the field within days of 
invasion with very little idea of what they would be facing; the leader of the program, 
George Stout, just wanted to get his men over there to give them a chance to prove 	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themselves.79 They had a general idea of where the structures and museums that they 
wanted to protect were but that was the extent of the preparation available to the unit.80 
This is arguably the greatest difference between the two programs and what made the 
ALIU function in a much more organized fashion.  
Since the ALIU was seen as a location to deposit all information regarding 
looting, they were quickly faced with the problem of how and where it would all be 
stored. It was eventually decided that the Washington office would keep a card catalogue 
with about 800 persons of interest.81 Sawyer’s major responsibility was, with the help of 
his assistant Mrs. Elizabeth Lambie, to created the file of personalities and material of 
interested to the ALIU mission that would be added to throughout the time the ALIU men 
were in the field.82 The information cards were designed so that information regarding 
German individuals could be quickly found. In order to accomplish this, each card was 
organized in the same way: name, alias, origin, address, date and place of birth, 
description, profession, background information and their present activities.83 Cards were 
created for each person of interest and each of their possible aliases. This is what later 
developed into a substantial card file that was located in Washington, and was used to 
decide which targets were highest priority for the ALIU men to interrogate.  
In the end of March, the ALIU dedicated two weeks to working with the Vaucher 
Commission to screen and edit lists of art dealers who were reported to be working with 
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the Germans in France.84 From the information gathered and organized during this 
period, the ALIU was able to develop around 300 new person of interest cards; they 
added to the files in the Washington D.C. ORION office.85 At the same time, the 
Washington office was working to create list of personnel to be targeted by the ALIU 
men as well as a list of repositories in Germany.86 These documents would eventually 
assist in the effort to decide which individuals the ALIU men would personally 
interrogate.  
For the first time, photographs were being added to the files in April of 1945. 
These photos were of art objects that had been stolen by the Nazis. Now, not only were 
the ALIU men able to see photographic evidence of what had been stolen, they were also 
able to see the faces of the men and women they were tracking down.  In April alone, two 
thousand photographs were added to the ALIU’s files.87 These photos were obtained 
from the Schencker firm that was located in Paris; before this time, there were no 
photographs added to the file.88 In addition to these photos, one thousand one hundred 
and sixty-three German personnel cards were obtained from the MFAA branch of the 
British Element Control Council for Germany and added to the ALIU card file.89 In 
addition to this information, the author explains the valuable meeting between the 
Vaucher Commission’s president and an unspecified ALIU member.90  
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In April a new member of the ALIU field operations team was added: Lieutenant 
Samson Lane Faison was a Williams College graduate who earned his Master’s degree 
from Harvard and a Masters of Fine Arts degree from Princeton.91 Faison had been an 
assistant professor at Yale, and in 1936 became a professor and department head at 
Williams College before enlisting in 1942.92 Initially, Faison was serving as a Naval 
Flight Recognition Instructor and a Training Officer for the Navy.93 Because of his 
background in art and art history, he was asked by the OSS to join the mission of the 
ALIU, and completed his OSS and X-2 training in May.94  
In June it was announced that Sawyer was officially appointed as the Assistant 
Secretary of the Roberts Commission.95 Sawyer’s current obligations for the ALIU were 
to be maintained, but he would work on a part time basis with the Roberts Commission.96 
To compensate for his newly acquired workload, Ellen O’Neill was hired on a temporary 
basis to help pick up the slack.97 Sawyer spent a period of the month in New York City 
speaking with Francis Taylor, director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and a member 
of the X-2 Branch in New York, on matters regarding ORION. It is seems likely that the 
meetings in New York were to further discuss the future of the program and how the 
information that was being collected would be used. Charles Sawyer’s appointment to 
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Assistant Secretary was put into effect on July 7th 1945.98 In addition to the hiring of 
O’Neill, Captain Otto Wittmann was hired to compensate for Sawyer’s new position.99 
Yet another member was added to the team during this period; Clara Ann Simmons was 
added to the department on July 16th 1945.100 Like O’Neill, the specific job Simmons 
possessed is not made clear, however since they were both working in the Washington 
office it can be assumed they likely worked on an either secretarial or analytical basis.  
 By investigating the primary documents from this period it is important to note 
the large percentage of documents that simply outline the goals of the program and the 
break down in leadership. This was initially surprising but then the reason for it became 
clear. It was important for the mission of the ALIU to remain focused. By sending out the 
strict description of the program to all agencies involved, the goals of the program 
became universally understood and respected. Here another comparison can be made to 
the MFAA; when they entered the field, very few members of the Army were aware of 
their mission, and thus were less likely to provide assistance. This lack of awareness 
came from the lack of sharing of documents that was present in the ALIU organization. 
Since the ALIU men entered the field after the MFAA, it seems that they must have taken 
note of this problem and tried to rectify it by briefing as many people as possible.  
By making their mission known, the agencies throughout Europe were aware of 
where they could locate the information they needed and what they had access too. This 
program, in comparison to the MFAA, was extremely organized. There was little leeway 
for change because the mission was so concise. And by informing the appropriate 
agencies, the ALIU men could go about their business without being questioned and 	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without delay. These major changes may be due to the time in which the program was 
established, but it also might be largely thanks to the organization that oversaw it. While 
the progress report and general memorandums may at some points feel tedious and 
repetitive, they are effective in showing the activities of the men. The ALIU was a small 
unit that quickly became the premier source for information and advice on the Nazi 
looting machine. They were able to not only provide information they collected from 
other agencies, but also produce information they had discovered through their own 
investigations and interrogations.  
The impact of the ALIU was a result of their careful collection of information 
that, while it didn’t lead to many convictions, it shed light on looting activities and was a 
valuable source to the Allied countries well after World War Two ended. The ALIU 
entered Europe just weeks after the biggest battle on the Western Front of the war had 
been fought.101 It was clear that the end of the war was nearing, and decisions were being 
made at the Yalta Conference to decide how Germany and Austria would be divided.102 
The work being done by the ALIU was to help prepare for life after the war, unlike the 
MFAA men, they were not protecting pieces of art they were preparing plans for future 
trials and reparations. By studying the Interrogation Reports, it is easy to understand the 
accomplishments of the ALIU men and the amount of work they accomplished in a short 
amount of time becomes clear.  
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Chapter Three: 
 The ALIU was developed with the purpose of providing a central location where 
information on the art looting activity in Europe could be collected and later 
disseminated. As previously discussed, the card files that were held in Washington D.C. 
were used to organize information on potential targets, but due to their size they could 
only contain basic information. Once targets were picked for the three ALIU men to 
pursue, it had to be decided how the information would be presented in its final form. Up 
to this point, the reports sent to the London and Washington offices show that Plaut and 
Rousseau were moving through Europe collecting information and developing a plan of 
how best to move forward in their mission. Once victory had been declared on May 9th, 
1945, the ALIU men were able to travel even more freely through Germany to carry out 
the remainder of their investigations.1 
By July 27th the three ALIU men had reported for duty at the ORION Detention 
Center, which was located in Altausse, Austria.2 The operations had been set up at 
“House 71” in Altausse largely because of the convenience of the location.3 The majority 
of the senior Nazi officials had fled to this area to avoid Allied advances; the ALIU were 
able to find the majority of the individuals they needed to interrogate in this area.4 In 
addition, this detention center was located in close proximity to the salt mines of 
Altausse, where a great percentage of the Nazi looted art had been hidden.5 The “House 
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71” was made up of cells that each held multiple prisoners; the average amount of time 
spent in this detention center was around forty days.6 
There is no direct documentation on when it was finally decided which German 
individuals would be interrogated by the ALIU. However, by the time July 27th, when the 
United States was in the midst of the Potsdam Conferences used to decide the fate of 
Europe and Japan following the war, the decision had been made and the investigations 
were in progress. When the final reports were submitted, the ALIU had prepared Detailed 
Interrogation Reports which focused on the following individuals: Heinrich Hoffman, 
Ernst Buchner, Robert Scholz, Gustav Rochlitz, Gunther Schiedlausky, Bruno Lohse, 
Gisela Limberger, Walter Andreas Hofer, Karl Kress, Walter Bornheim, Hermann Voss, 
and Karl Haberstock. Many of the targets were higher ups in museums, some art critics 
and one was Goering’s personal assistant. While very few of these individuals were ever 
convicted, they provided useful information that shed light on the larger looting 
operation.  
It is important to note that the list of reports available today, does not represent 
the entire collection that was prepared during the war by the ALIU men. There were 
originally fifteen Detailed Interrogation Reports created, three of which were not 
included in the microfilm material.7  The ALIU men gathered the information for the 
reports regarding Kajetan Muehlmann, Maria Dietrick and Rose Bauer but the Direct 
Interrogation Reports were never completed.8 While all three of these documents were 
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completed by the time of publication, they were not included because the majority of the 
relevant material was covered in the Consolidated Interrogation Reports.9  
In addition, there was a fourth Consolidated Interrogation Report listed in the 
index of the compiled document but it was never completed. The third Consolidated 
Interrogation Report was supposed to regard the German or Nazi methods of acquisition 
during the war, however the ALIU men never completed it.10 Finally there are five 
institutional reports issued by the ALIU which should also be mentioned: “The Miedl 
Case”, “Interim Report of German Looting of Works of Art in France”, “Report on 
Progress of Current Investigation of Looted Art in Switzerland”, “U.S. Investigation of 
Looted Art in Switzerland”, and the “Report on Activities of the Art Looting 
Investigation Unit in France”.11  
 In contrast to the individual reports, the Consolidated Interrogation Reports 
focused on the larger organizations that were active during the war. The ALIU produced 
four reports that addressed the following issues: the activity of Rosenberg in France, the 
Goering Collection, and the Linz Museums. The interrogations are unique in the fact that 
the ALIU allowed British, French and Dutch representatives to assist in the questioning 
where they felt it was necessary.12 Throughout the program’s history it has been clear that 
it was largely collaborative; this piece of information makes that even clearer. The ALIU 
appears to not be concerned with being the only organization to work on the 
interrogations; they seem willing to share the responsibility but also the credit. These are 
valuable documents because they give first hand accounts of the information that was 	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received by the ALIU men during their interrogations. Aside from the information 
regarding their actions during the war, the reports contain information on the career, 
business endeavors, family, relationship with Hitler and the larger German art-looting 
mission.  
The first Consolidated Report to be produced by the ALIU was in regards to the 
activity of Alfred Rosenberg during the war. The Einsatzstab Reicheleiter Rosenberg fur 
die Besetzen Gebiete, or the Einsatzstab, was formed during World War Two under the 
Foreign Political Office of the Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg.13  The position of 
Reichsleiter was held by several individuals and was the rank directly under the Führer.14 
The Reichsleiter, or Reich leaders, were responsible for various portfolios that dealt with 
topics such as finance, propaganda, foreign policy, and laws during the war.15 
Rosenberg’s job was originally to collect political materials from countries occupied by 
Germany with the intent of exploring the “struggle against Jewry and Freemasonry”.16 
However, in November of 1940, Goering extended formal orders that gave the 
Einsatzstab the authority to confiscate “ownerless” pieces from Jewish art collections; 
this quickly became the primary function of the Einsatzstab.17 By the end of the war, it is 
estimated by Plaut that the Einsatzstab, in France alone, took a total of 21,903 objects 
from 203 collections.18  
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On November 18th 1940, Hitler ordered all confiscated works of art to be sent to 
Germany so that they could be at his personal disposal.19 The efficiency of the 
Einsatzstab was repeatedly put at risk by the lack of authoritative direction as well as 
internal friction; Goering had created a monopoly on the art being collected by the 
Einsatzstab.20 In the early stages of the Einsatzstab activity, the program was described as 
being in a state of chaos; during his interview, Scholz stated that the Einsatzstab 
employed irresponsible men, who were not qualified to be doing the art historical work 
and proper protocol was rarely followed.21 While being interviewed for their own DIR 
reports, Scholz, Lohse and Schiedlausky all stated that the art historians who were a part 
of the mission constantly protested the “irregularity of this procedure”; they also made it 
clear that they had refused to send work to Germany until basic inventories had been 
prepared.22 
James Plaut, the author of this CIR, wrote, “it is the utmost significance that, 
whereas the confiscations of the Einsatzstab in France were conducted under authority 
vested in the Rosenberg office by the Reichschancellery (Hitler), the important operations 
were dominated by Goering”.23 This was as a direct contradiction of the orders issued 
previously by Hitler. Instead of collecting art for the personal use of Hitler, Goering was 
now using his “personal sponsorship” to exploit the activities for his own benefit; this 
happened from 1940 through 1942.24 While it is likely that Rosenberg felt he should 
follow Hitler’s orders exactly, he did not have enough political power to oppose 
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Goering.25 Goering was able to help Rosenberg’s operation by supplying much needed 
transportation and military escorts through the Luftwaffe men, which gave him control.26 
It was not until June 18th, 1942 that Rosenberg finally told Goering that he could no 
longer use the Einsatzstab for his own personal collection.27 
In December of 1940, Robert Scholz was asked by Rosenberg to visit Paris to 
determine the extent to which Goering was taking advantage of the Einsatzstab.28 Scholz 
was an integral member of the Einsatzstab organization because of his position as the 
personal advisor in art matters for Rosenberg but also as the Director of the Amt Bildende 
Kunst. When in Paris, Scholz was told that Goering had received the approval of Hitler to 
examine the confiscated collections and make the decision of what should be done with 
them.29 Scholz, according to Plaut, had concluded that many of the men in the 
Einsatzstab in Paris were working with Goering’s best interests in mind instead of the 
Führer and that he was in fact collecting confiscated art for his own personal collection.30 
It was clear to Plaut that Goering had taken over the Einsatzstab’s operation. Goering 
would give forty-eight hour notice for when he would arrive in Paris and expected a 
special exhibition of works to be presented to him at the Jeu de Paume museum.31 
While writing the Consolidated Report on the Rosenberg activity, Plaut also 
interrogated Scholz directly because of his obvious connection with the Einsatzstab 
through his association with Rosenberg. During the war, Scholz was both a painter and an 
art critic, which is what made him so appealing to Rosenberg. He oversaw the creation of 	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scientific records of the works, the shipment to Germany, and the maintenance of the 
locations to which the art was being sent.32 When being interviewed, multiple sources 
confirmed to Plaut that Scholz had expressed his desire to terminate the activity of the 
Einsatzstab in France; he was worried about the condition of the art and what would 
happen to them after they were taken.33  
During his interrogation, Plaut notes that Scholz repeatedly tried to show that he 
was not personally responsible for any of the looting action that was conducted by the 
Einsatzstab; he argued that his main contribution was the creation of catalogues for 
Rosenberg.34 Plaut states in his report of the interrogation that this was all a lie; aside 
from Alfred Rosenberg, Scholz was the highest-ranking official of the Einsatzstab 
Rosenberg in custody, and thus he should suffer the consequences of his actions.35 Plaut 
concluded that Scholz should be held personally responsible, along with Rosenberg, for 
the implementation of all the art confiscation that was undertaken by the Einsatzstab; in 
other words, he was to be labeled a war criminal.36 
Another important individual to the case being compiled against Rosenberg was 
Bruno Lohse. In the early months of 1941, Goering chose Lohse as his personal art 
representative, based on his art historical background.37 Lohse was an art historian but 
also a member of the Nazi Party and was interrogated by Plaut in August of 1945.38 
Lohse was given credentials, which were signed by Goering that ordered all German 
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military and civilian units to facilitate his mission.39 Lohse and Gunther Schiedlausky 
were ordered to arrange exhibits of confiscated work, which they thought, would be 
appealing to Goering.40 In addition to this, Lohse was supposed to make surveys of the 
open Paris art market on Goering’s behalf.41 When interviewing Schiedlausky, Plaut 
found that between November 1940 and December 1941, he and Lohse had arranged ten 
exhibits for Goering.42 Once Goering was shown the works that had been collected by the 
Einsatzstab, he had to “legitimize” the acquisitions; this meant that Goering along with 
his chief buyer Walter Andreas Hofer would choose which pieces he wished to acquire 
for his personal collection.43 In the documentation from these exchanges, there was never 
a form of payment specified and the Einsatzstab was not compensated.44 
According to the report, Lohse thought that the Einsatzstab confiscated art on 
legal terms and that there had been an agreement made between both the French and 
German governments.45 His initial responsibility had been to prepare catalogues and 
inventories of the newly confiscated Einsatzstab objects.46 After giving a tour of the Jeu 
de Paume to Goering, Lohse was ordered to remain in Paris with the assignment of 
recommending art for Goering’s private collection as well as the Linz collection.47 Lohse 
was never fully satisfied by his position under Goering; he felt that he was not given the 
right amount of independence and was always being overpowered by Hofer.48  
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Towards the end of the war, Lohse often asked his superiors to be released from 
the art unit and to be returned to active duty in the field; Goering was not willing to allow 
this to happen because of his ability to help the program.49 When summarizing his 
investigation, Plaut outlines the four accusations against Lohse: his responsibility for 
reckless confiscation of French art objects and properties, the personal theft of valuable 
works of art, threatening and persecution of Frenchmen, Jews and other individuals and 
for being an active member in the Schutzstaffel or S.S.50 Throughout the interrogation, 
Lohse never tried to deny his personal responsibilities for the acts and crimes that were 
committed by the Einsatzstab; he additionally did not try to separate himself from 
Goering or minimize his relationship with him.51 After conducting the interrogation, 
Plaut firmly believed that Lohse never received commission, never kept confiscated 
pieces for himself, never threatened or persecuted Jews and thus should simply be held as 
a material witness in the later trials to be held against Goering.52 If he was to be brought 
up on charges as a war criminal, Plaut argued that he should be given leniency because of 
his cooperation with the ALIU.53  
Gunther Schiedlausky was an art historian who had been working at the State 
Museum of Berlin, since February of 1935.54 From the beginning of World War Two 
until June of 1940, Schiedlausky was credited with engaging in the protection and 
concealment of works of art that had belonged to the State Museum.55 Schiedlausky was 
drafted in June of 1940 but was transferred in November to work with the Einsatzstab 	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Rosenberg. 56 His initial assignments for the Einsatzstab was to prepare exhibitions of 
newly acquired work for Goering; he clarified during his interrogation that by the time he 
had been drafted the major items had already been confiscated from family homes and 
was already in the possession of the Germans.57  
A major change was made to the Einsatzstab in December of 1941; Rosenberg 
recommended to Hitler that all the furnishings in “ownerless” Jewish residents within the 
Western Occupied Territories should be seized.58 The purpose of this seizure would be so 
that Party officials could furnish bombed-out areas in the East.59 Once approved, this 
newly established confiscation legislation came to be known as the M-Action.60 Scholz 
and Schiedlausky worked to prepare a “Revision” report which included the proposal that 
the future activity of the art staff should be restricted to the following “(a) the methodical 
conservation and cataloging of the collections already in had and (b) the rigid control of 
all materials confiscated under the new M-Action”.61 It was becoming clear, according the 
Plaut, that the men working for the art staff were becoming aware of the highly 
complicated task they were undertaking; they were now becoming responsible for 
making inventories of all art objects that were found in residences that had been 
requisitioned by the German military for officers’ billets.62 
During his investigation, which was held in August of 1945, Plaut discovered that 
Schiedlausky was also responsible for the cataloguing, inventory and research of the 
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pieces that had been confiscated by the Einsatzstab.63 On September 1941, Schiedlausky 
was assigned to Neuschwanstein (a German castle where much of the stolen art was 
being kept) where he became the “custodian of the deposit”.64 When the United States 
Army moved into German territory, Schiedlausky placed himself in their custody; 
because of this, it was decided by Plaut that he should not be considered a war criminal 
but instead be used as a material witness during the Nuremberg Trials.65 In addition, it 
was suspected that under supervision, Schiedlausky could be used as a valuable asset in 
the restitution process.66 
Karl Kress was a photographer during World War Two who was responsible for 
documenting works of art for the Einsatzstab;67 this work kept Kress mainly working in 
Paris.68 It was important to the Einsatzstab operation that Kress was able to protect the 
negatives of the images he took so that Hitler could use them when assembling his 
collection after the war ended.69 Kress worked only at the Jeu de Paume and never 
accompanied the Einsatzstab on their trips to private homes.70 Plaut concludes that Kress 
was a relatively unimportant figure in the large looting machine and held no 
responsibility for what happened; because of this, Kress was released from ALIU custody 
and was not to be called as a material witness.71  
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Gustav Rochlitz was also interrogated by Plaut and was useful to this CIR 
because of his activity as an art dealer during the war.72 Before the Second World War, 
Rochlitz had been a painter and illustrator and became an art dealer.73 Throughout the 
war, Rochlitz dealt only to German citizens; according to the report, this was not his 
choice but instead determined by the situation.74 This means that Rochlitz did not 
determine his buyers by their nationality, but they were the largest group who were active 
buyers of possibly confiscated or stolen goods during this period. He was very emphatic 
on his position as an anti-Nazi and was attempting to become a French, instead of 
German, citizen; by dealing only with Germans, he was worried that he would be labeled 
as a collaborator.75 In 1944, Rochlitz discovered that twenty-nine of the paintings he had 
sold were being sent to the Linz museum; because he had now made a substantial 
addition to the collection, Rochlitz hoped that he would not be sent back to active duty.76  
Throughout the entire investigation, Rochlitz admitted he was aware that eighty-
two of the paintings that he received from the Einsatzstab had been confiscated illegally 
from French Jewish collections.77 He attempted to argue that he was forced by the 
Einsatzstab to cooperate.78 But when interviewed by Plaut, the people who worked with 
Rochlitz stated that he was always willing or even eager to work with the Einsatzstab.79 
They pointed to three key reasons that enticed him to do the work that he did: he could 
make huge profits, he was able to establish a prominent position in the German art circles 
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and was able to avoid military service.80 Plaut wrote in the report that “he appears to have 
acted at all times in his own interest as an unscrupulous opportunist”.81 It was decided by 
Plaut that due to the case made against him, Rochlitz should be placed at the disposition 
of the French government where they would decide if he should be given criminal 
charges.82 
 The second Consolidated Interrogation Report explored the Goering Collection 
and the history of its formation as well as the methods that were used to apprehend the 
cultural items from all over Europe.83 Hermann Goering was one of the primary leaders 
of the Nazi Party and was instrumental in the creation of policies regarding looting.84 
During the war, Goering held the title of Reichsmarschall of the Third German Reich; 
this meant that he was the “Marshal of the Empire”.85 With his powerful position, 
Goering created a widespread enterprise that touched every area occupied by Germans.86 
When writing this report, Theodore Rousseau used information that had been compiled 
by the ALIU from countries all over Europe.87 In addition, the following individuals were 
interrogated and their Detailed Interrogation Reports shed light on the larger 
organization: Hofer, Limberger, Lohse, Kress, Walter Bornheim, and Karl Haberstock.88 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid, 11.     
81 Ibid, 12.  
82 Ibid, 12.  
83Theodore Rousseau, O.S.S. Art Looting Investigation Unit, “The Goering Collection," Consolidated 
Interrogation Reports, Report Number Two, 1945, p. 1, RG 239, Entry 75 [A1], Microfilm m1782, 
National Archives, College Park, Maryland.  (Here after, OSS Microfilm).  
84 “Hermann Goring”, last modified July 13, 2014. 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/239310/Hermann-Goring 
85 Ibid.  
86 Theodore Rousseau, O.S.S. Art Looting Investigation Unit, “The Goering Collection," Consolidated 
Interrogation Reports, Report Number Two, 1945, OSS Microfilm, p. 1.   
87 Ibid, 1.  
88Ibid, 1-2.   
	   54	  
Other individuals such as Kajetan Muehlann, Rose Bauer, and Aloys Miedl were 
interviewed, but their reports are unavailable.89 
 Goering had begun his art collection after the end of the World War One. When 
Hitler came to power in the 1930’s, he quickly aligned himself with the new Führer and 
worked to create a plan, which would allow him to gather an even larger collection.90 The 
collection in question was going to be named the Hermann Goering Collection and would 
be housed in a large museum whose site was never chosen.91 The collection that was 
amassed by Goering included everything from tapestries to objets d’art to jewelry.92 
Goering initially hired Binder, a Berlin art dealer to be his advisor; Hofer was assigned to 
be his successor after a short time.93 When asked about Goering in his interrogation, 
Hofer noted that he was a hard man to work for because while it was often “easy to bring 
him around and change his mind” he could also prove to be immensely stubborn.94 
Goering was determined to make a collection of art that would be envied on an 
international basis. He relied on men such as Hofer to assist him to make this possible.  
Rousseau outlines three main aspects of Goering’s personality that played a large 
role in the creation of his collection: he saw no limits to what he desired, he had 
unlimited resources at his disposal and he always bargained no matter how low the 
original price was.95 Rousseau comments that Goering was a “hard-headed, acquisitive 
businessman”: he wanted to buy everything and at the lowest price possible.96 It was also 
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states that Goering made it clear that he did not steal any of the work in his possession 
because he always intended on eventually paying for it.97 Possibly most remarkable of 
all, no matter what state the German defense was in, Goering was always focused on and 
put the most time into his collection.98 Rousseau also explains that Goering had a strong 
tendency to distrust everyone who worked for him.99 The feeling of distrust apparently 
spread to his staff; during their interrogations, both Limberger and Hofer accused their 
fellow employees of concealing information.100  
Gisela Limberger was an integral to the investigation of Rosenberg but even more 
so for the investigation into Goering because of her role as his trusted assistant; she 
worked for the Nazi party, she never became a member.101 When interrogated by 
Rousseau she was able to provide information of the inner workings of the Goering 
looting machine.102 Limberger was trained as a librarian but had no direct training or 
interest in art.103 Her main job was to oversee and control Goering’s private 
correspondence and his finances; because of his great distrust in people, she was the only 
one who was trusted to type on his behalf.104  
While her main tasks were secretarial, Limberger was able to make two 
significant contributions to the effort against Goering’s art looting. The first contribution 
that she made was insisting that Goering create lists of every piece of art being taken in 
by his unit and where it was taken from; without this information, restitution would have 
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proven to be much more difficult.105 In addition, Limberger was able to convince Goering 
that he should not take items from Monte Cassino (a monastery in Italy) as Hofer had 
previously recommended.106 Because she was not involved directly in the looting mission 
and was simply an office worker she was released and not required to give testimony; 
however, she decided to volunteer herself as a witness.107 
Walter Andreas Hofer proved to be one of the most influential individuals that the 
ALIU interrogated. Hofer had a background as both an art historian and art dealer, which 
is what made him appealing to the German government.108 He was closely aligned with 
Goering for five years during the war developing the collection and deciding methods 
that would be used to obtain the objects; formally, Hofer was Goering’s personal art 
advisor and art buyer.109 During his time with Goering, Hofer never joined the Nazi Party 
because it was not a requirement; however, during his interrogation he made it clear that 
if he had been asked to join he would have done so.110 Rousseau noted that, during his 
interrogations, Hofer often tried to down play his importance and involvement in the 
looting actions; he argued that he only advised Goering on items that had been purchased 
legally.111 This was hard to believe given his position as chief advisor and, and as 
Rousseau notes in is DIR, Hofer was always at “his master’s elbow, with a plan, fair or 
foul, to obtain the objects which they desired”.112 Rousseau states that there is undeniable 
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proof that Hofer visited the Jeu de Paume to choose which confiscated paintings would 
be sent to Goering.113  
In the end, his paper trial proved Hofer’s guilt; they showed a direct knowledge 
and involvement in the confiscation, payment and sale of stolen works.114 It was observed 
in his file that he was dishonest and underhanded in not only his interrogation, but in his 
business practices.115 In his personal letters to Goering, there is clear reference to his 
involvement in financial matters and how he succeeded in lowing prices of the works he 
purchased.116 Rousseau states that Goering “opened up to him the doors, not only of 
collections in Germany, but of almost any source of works of art in the occupied 
countries. It also gave him the possibility of promising protection to those persecuted by 
Nazis in exchange for the sale of something they desired”.117  
Hofer profited by encouraging friends and contacts of Goering to use him when 
they were looking to buy gifts for Goering.118 While his purchasing activities took up the 
majority of Hofer’s time, he was also responsible for the conservation, storage, 
transportation, and cataloguing of the items that came into Goering’s possession.119 This 
report shows the degree to which Hofer was involved in the Goering organization; he 
worked directly with Goering and accompanied him on trips to find artwork.120 Rousseau 
concludes his report stating that Hofer should be held as a material witness but should 
then also be indicted as a war criminal himself for his involvement with Goering.121 
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Walter Bornheim was another individual who was interrogated by the ALIU and 
worked on the Goering Collection. Bornheim proved useful to Goering because of his 
educational background in sculpture.122 After Goering visited his shop in Cologne, 
Bornheim became a buyer of sculpture for the Goering Collection; Goering asked him to 
“take advantage of any opportunities offered by the art market”.123 While he worked for 
Goering from 1938 until the end of the war, Bornheim never became a member of the 
Nazi Party.124 Bornheim quickly became the biggest German art buyer in Paris and was 
also the most well known; he was known for buying every type of object and also paying 
high prices for the works he acquired.125 During his interrogation, Bornheim voluntarily 
shared all the information that was relevant to the case.126 Rousseau states in his report 
that out of all the agents working for Goering, Bornheim seemed to be the most honest.127 
He acted solely as an art dealer and was never involved in the actual looting or 
confiscation of art; based on the evidence available to Rousseau, it appeared that he never 
used the position given to him by Goering to pressure those who were unwilling to sell 
their work.128 He was called to be a material witness for the Nuremberg Trials and was 
placed as a resource for the French government for restitution.129 
Bruno Lohse, while important to the Rosenberg case, was also vital to the case 
being made against Goering. During his trips to Paris, Goering would visit the Jeu de 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 “The Goering Collection," 14.   
123  Theodore Rousseau, O.S.S. Art Looting Investigation Unit, “Walter Bornheim," Detailed Interrogation 
Reports, Report Number Eleven, 1945, OSS Microfilm, 2.  
  “The Goering Collection," 15.   
124 “Walter Bornheim," 1. 
125 “Walter Bornheim," 3.  
126Ibid, 6.   
127 “The Goering Collection," 16.   
128 “Walter Bornheim," 6.   
“The Goering Collection," 15-16.   
129 “Walter Bornheim," 7.   
	   59	  
Paume to see exhibits of materials, which had been confiscated by the Einsatzstab since 
his last visit.130 Many of the individuals who were interrogated for the case being made 
against the Einsatzstab Reichsteilter Rosenberg overlap with the case against Goering; 
this is because Goering used the work of the Einsatzstab for his own benefit. In the report 
prepared by Rousseau, it is stated that Goering took five hundred ninety-six items from 
Einsatzstab custody at the Jeu de Paume.131An interesting element that is mentioned in 
this report is that the art that was taken by the Nazi Party from Germany was not 
considered looted.132 
 Karl Haberstock was one of the many dealers who made exchanges with 
Goering, but is relevant because he was also interrogated by the ALIU. Before the 
beginning of World War Two, Haberstock had been in close contact with Goering.133 The 
report begins with a striking claim made by Rousseau; he states, “Haberstock’s entire 
career was based on two principles: anti-Semitism and Germanic chauvinism.”134 
Haberstock joined the Nazi Party and was an enthusiastic member; he was even referred 
to as a “crusader” against “degenerate” art.135 The high point of Haberstock’s career came 
when Hitler appointed him as the chief advisor to Hans Posse at the Linz Museum.136 In 
this position he would have direct influence over how Hitler’s collection at Linz would be 
created and what it would contain.137 Because of this appointment, he was briefly cut off 
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from his position as an advisor to Goering.138 Throughout the war, he traveled to through 
occupied territories but spent the majority of his time in France where he did much of his 
dealing.139 Haberstock’s position in the Nazi Party and his leadership role in the purchase 
and distribution of stolen art led Rousseau to come to the conclusion that he should be 
tried at the same level of severity as the leading Linz officials.140  
During World War Two, according to Rousseau’s report, Goering liked to refer to 
himself as a “Renaissance type”; this meant that he was interested in collecting every 
medium of art and artifacts and also from every occupied country.141 By trusting few 
individuals with his personal information he was able to create a façade of being, as 
Rousseau puts it, “the best of the Nazis”.142 As the investigation into his organization 
continued, it became clear that this was just that, a façade. Rousseau concludes his 
document with the statement that Goering was “cruel, grasping, deceitful and 
hypocritical, well suited to take his place with Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels and the rest”.143 
The information for this report would not have been available had the ALIU men not 
conducted their interrogations. Throughout the document, Rousseau cites where and 
whom his information was coming from, and in the majority of cases it came from 
Limberger and Hofer.  
The fourth and final report is an exploration of the plans for the Linz museum and 
library written by Faison and completed in December of 1945. In the preface of this 
document, Faison outlines the three goals of this report were the following: “to identify 
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the personalities involved and the particular role played by each, to classify the methods 
employed in amassing the collection and to indicate the sources from which the works 
were obtained”.144 There is significance behind the choice of Linz as the new center for 
art created by Hitler; Linz was where Hitler grew up.145 Faison explains that Hitler 
wanted the people who knew him in his youth to “bask in his success”; he saw that the 
best way to do this was to create a national museum that would rival the other major 
European art centers.146 In order for this dream to become a reality, Hitler was prepared 
to completely remake the city, with the Führermuseum at its center; this would all be 
done under his close supervision.147  
The information that was used for this report was primarily taken from the 
Detailed Interrogation Reports of Voss, Haberstock and Hoffmann.148 However the ALIU 
reports created for Hofer, Lohse, Limberger, Buchner and Bornheim were also used.149 
When this report was created, there was little information regarding the distinction 
between the works of art that were destined for Hitler’s private property and the art that 
was intended for the Linz Museum.150 Until the documents were sorted and it was 
determined which items were designated for which purpose, a complete understanding of 
the project would not be possible. The differentiation between these two purposes of the 
art, however, was not vitally important to the work of Faison: it seems that Faison treated 
the two as the same for this report to look at the overall looting patterns.151 This was one 
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of the first studies to be done of the Linz museum and its connection to Nazi looting. The 
MFAA had not been interested in the Linz organization for the same intelligence reasons 
as the ALIU. Instead they were focused on finding where the art, which was destined for 
the museum, was being hidden for the remainder of the war. The ALIU provided a source 
that would be used as a basis for all further study of this topic.  
Hitler looked to Haberstock to see whether or not he thought this dream would be 
able to become a reality.152 Haberstock believed that the Dresden museum held the status 
Hitler wanted to achieve; when it was discovered that the director, Hans Posse, had 
recently lost his job Hitler quickly offered him the job of directing the Linz museum.153 
During their interrogation with the ALIU both Haberstock and Hoffmann stated that, 
contrary to current belief, Hitler only wanted a few paintings for his personal residence 
but instead intended for the large body of work that was being collected to eventually be 
used for the museum.154 Because they were not yet sure of the amount and quality of the 
work that would end up being confiscated, Hitler decided to wait until the war was over 
to sort the works and then if there were ones that neither he nor the Linz museum wanted, 
they would be sent to the provincial museums around German.155 
Posse, unlike Hitler, had a trained eye for art and appreciated a larger selection of 
art and artifacts.156 Before Posse’s appointment, Heinrich Hoffmann had been Hitler’s 
main advisor; Hoffmann and Hitler were similar in the fact that their taste in art did not 
extend much past nineteenth century German painters.157 Posse was determined to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Ibid, 2.   
153 Ibid, 3.   
154 Ibid, 3.   
155 Ibid, 3.   
156 Ibid, 3.   
157 Ibid, 3.   
	   63	  
increase the quality and breath of the collection that would be housed in the Linz 
museum.158 In his position given to him by Hitler, Posse had the authority over all 
collections that were destined for the museum in Linz; this collection of materials came 
to be known as the “Führer Reserve”.159 Posse would work in conjunction with Hitler to 
decide which items he wanted specifically targeted and found throughout the occupied 
territory. Posse oversaw this operation until his death in December of 1942; Hermann 
Voss was then appointed as the director of both the Dresden museum and the Linz 
operations.160 
On April 21, 1943, Martin Bormann ordered, on behalf of Hitler, that all objects, 
which were seized by the Einsatzstab, be immediately sent to the Führer’s experts for 
further handling; one of these experts was Voss.161 Hitler oversaw the entire looting 
organization, Bormann worked directly under him and then Voss was the next tier of 
power.162 When it became unsafe to store the artwork in Germany this group of men 
worked together to decide that it should sent to the Steinberg salt mine in Altaussee and 
stayed there for the remainder of the war.163 This is what led to the major art repositories 
discovered by groups such as the MFAA.  
Hermann Voss was an art historian who also had a background in political 
intelligence and was interviewed by Faison.164 When he was being interrogated, he 
claimed that the reason he took the position in the museum was so that he would be able 
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to protect the art from inside the organization.165 He made the argument that the art was 
going to be confiscated no matter what, and why not have that art sent to where he could 
control it and ensure its safety?166 Faison writes in the Direct Interrogation Report that 
Voss was able to “keep his hands clean by leaving the dirty work to others”;167 it was 
hard to make conclusions about the man because he left virtually no paper trail and often 
served behind the scenes. While much of his work was to create inventories and protocols 
to protect the art that had been taken, Faison argues that Voss had “the chance to stop 
proceedings and that he did not”.168  
Voss is a hard individual to understand; much of his work seems to be done with 
positive intentions but he probably could have done more to stop what was happening 
right under his nose.  In the Consolidated Interrogation Report, Faison argues that the 
most questionable of Voss’ activities was his involvement in the purchase of the Schloss 
collection.169 At the end of the interrogation, it was decided that Voss should be labeled 
as a potential war criminal and should be tried at the Nuremberg Trials.170 However, 
because of his experience and knowledge of the collection, he was to be used as a 
consultant at the Central Collecting Point in Munich where he would work through 
inventories and work on the redistribution and restitution projects.171  
Heinrich Hoffmann was a close personal friend of Hitler’s and they possessed a 
very similar taste in art; they both preferred German art that was created before the 
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nineteenth century.172 Because of their friendship, it is likely that Hoffmann had a 
personal knowledge of the plans and goals of Hitler; however, it is unlikely that he had 
much of a role in the development of the Linz collection.173 As Rousseau states in the 
conclusion of his Detailed Interrogation Report, he was a man who was a “parasite of the 
Nazi regime”.174 Hoffmann made his name in the art world by developing a monopoly on 
photographs and their reproductions during the war, which were later, used to create an 
art magazine that was targeted to the common man.175 While he was never employed by 
the Linz operation, Hoffmann often worked as a middleman.176 
 Hoffmann proved to be a very unreliable source because he changed his story 
from day to day and also changed his opinion on Hitler and the other Nazi officials he 
worked with.177 Hoffmann’s colleagues during the war did not even seem to respect him; 
Haberstock made his low opinion of him known in his interrogation.178 The only way he 
could prove to be useful would be to assist in the investigation to identify works of art 
and the countries from which they were acquired; in addition it was recommended by 
Rousseau that he be put at the disposition of the G-5 or the MFAA.179 
As explained in conjunction with the discussion on the Goering Collection, 
Haberstock was a major art dealer during this period. The majority of his success during 
the war came from his ability to skillfully use his position within Nazi circles for his own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172“Linz: Hitler’s Museum and Library," 3.   
 Theodore Rousseau, O.S.S. Art Looting Investigation Unit, “Heinrich Hoffmann," Detailed Interrogation 
Reports, Report Number Twelve, 1945, OSS Microfilm, 3.    
173 Ibid, 8.   
174 Ibid, 8.   
175 Ibid, 1.   
176 “Linz: Hitler’s Museum and Library," 44.   
177 “Heinrich Hoffmann," 8.   
178 “Linz: Hitler’s Museum and Library," 43.   
179 “Heinrich Hoffmann," 8.   
	   66	  
personal benefit.180 Hitler favored him as a dealer because their taste in art was similar.181 
In his interrogation, Voss accused Haberstock of using “unscrupulous methods to force 
certain museum directors to exchange for works by nineteenth century German 
masters”.182 Throughout his interrogation, Haberstock repeated that he had acted honestly 
and correctly in every deal he participated in throughout the war; every source that was 
found or person who was interviewed contradicted this statement.183 Voss stated in his 
interrogation that when speaking with Posse’s wife, it became clear that both Posse and 
Hitler were becoming “suspicious of Haberstock’s shrewdness”.184 These opinions and 
accusations add more explanation to Rousseau’s conclusion that he should be tried at the 
same level as leading Linz employees. 
One of the minor figures in the overall Linz operation was Ernst Buchner, who 
was the director general of the Bavarian State Museum during World War Two.185 
Buchner was never an official agent of the Linz operation but was consulted often by 
Linz authorities on the grounds of authorship and authenticity of various items.186 During 
his interrogation, Buchner denied having any detailed knowledge of the Linz operation or 
the provenance of the pictures he examined.187 Even though Buchner was a member of 
the Nazi Party, it is likely that he was an honest worker and joined simply because it was 
a requirement for his position.188 In the conclusion of this document, Rousseau 
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recommended that Buchner be placed under house arrest at the disposition of the 
MFAA.189 In addition, it was stated that he was to be prohibited from holding any 
positions in the newly formed German fine arts administration.190 
In the conclusion of his report, which was completed in December of 1945, 
Faison discusses the Nuremberg Trials (which began in November of 1945 and lasted 
until October of 1946). He discusses that the Linz Museum was currently being seen as a 
valid and legal escape for the decisions made by high-level government official in 
Germany.191 The Nazis put laws into place that made their looting and confiscation legal; 
in order for the legal basis of the Linz Museum to be called into question the prosecution 
would have to prove that it was a criminal organization.192 The Nazi party was skilled at 
making it look as if their purchases were legal and paid for at the proper price, even 
though this was almost never the case.193 Faison made three major recommendations that 
he hoped would be followed after the presentation of the ALIU material. He stated that: 
the Linz commission or museum should be declared a criminal organization, the 
members of the Linz museum should stand on trial and that the German art dealers and 
agents who worked for the museum be investigated on an individual basis.194 
By the time the ALIU reports were completed (in August, September and 
December of 1945), Europe had already celebrated V-E Day and had begun to develop 
plans for what would come next in Europe. The Allied countries had to decide how best 
to deal with the massive losses they suffered. These losses were much more then the 
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pieces of art that were stolen, they had lost a huge percentage of their population. It is 
important to remember this when looting at these documents. The ALIU were not an 
isolated entity, they were working during a very emotional time for Europeans and 
navigated the landscape as best they could to prepare for the repatriation of what had 
been stolen.  
The importance of the ALIU and their mission becomes apparent when examining 
these documents. This was not simply an organization that collected information. 
Through their interrogations, as well as information provided to them by other 
organizations, the ALIU men were able to prepare documents that would help prosecute 
of major war criminals. When studied independently from the Consolidated Interrogation 
Reports, the individuals interrogated by the ALIU men may seem relatively unimportant 
when compared to major war criminals such as Hitler. However, the Consolidated 
Reports show how the information gathered from these individuals came together to 
synthesis a strong case against the following three organizations: the Linz Museum, the 
Goering Collection and the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg. The task of the ALIU 
men and their influence went much further then simply collecting and disseminating 
information. They had quickly become experts on the larger operations of the Nazi 
looting machine and were looked to by European governments for assistance in 
completing their own investigations, but also for advice of how to best set up an ALIU 
type organization of their own. It quickly becomes clear that the work of the ALIU was 
not done when they finished their Interrogation Reports.  
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Chapter Four: 
The Consolidated and Detailed Interrogation Reports represent the accumulation 
of the work that was accomplished by the ALIU men while they were working in Europe 
during World War Two. The current plan for the information that was being collected 
was that it would be used for the anticipated trials regarding war crimes.1 While the 
majority of the men interrogated by the ALIU were not convicted, their testimonies 
worked to shed light on the larger, and arguably, more important organizations, the Linz 
Museum, Goering’s Collection and Rosenberg’s activates.  This is where the legacy of 
the ALIU stands; it was a small organization that worked to create reports that were used 
to develop case against the men who worked with Hitler to capture Europe’s greatest 
cultural treasures. However, their legacy did not end here. The ALIU had developed 
detailed information on the looting activity that had taken over the continent; their 
documentation would prove to have a lasting effect, decades after the completion of the 
war when looted art was continuing to be found and its origins determined.  
In September, Plaut was sent to report in Washington D.C. to discuss the future 
policies of the ALIU operation.2 While Plaut was gone, Rousseau and Faison continued 
their work in Altausse.3 At the end of September, Rousseau was called to London to meet 
with the Office of United States Counsel for Nuremberg.4 Faison closed with the ORION 
Detention Center in the final weeks of September and the ALIU men were sent back to 
London. Rousseau was sent to Paris on October 25th and was to continue to Switzerland 
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later that month.5 Plaut and Faison left London together on October 23rd and went to 
Nuremberg and then on Munich.6 There are no details included about what the men were 
doing in these locations; it can be assumed that the men were tying up loose ends to their 
investigation and meeting with representatives for the Nuremberg Trials because of the 
cities mentioned in the file.  
In the first week of November, Plaut was in Nuremberg working to establish a 
relationship with the United States Chief of Counsel for the upcoming Nuremberg Trial.7 
During this trip, new channels were discovered that would prove to be useful for future 
attempts of persecuting German art looters.8 During this period, Rousseau was in France 
developing relationships with high-level French authorities; he was interested in the 
persecution of French collaborators in the German art-looting machine.9 While Plaut and 
Rousseau were planning for the future, Faison was continuing to investigate the Linz 
Collection in and around Munich.10 This is the final progress report that is present in the 
material located at the National Archive in College Park. These final reports are 
important because they show that the ALIU men were still active after finishing their 
reports. This supports the fact that the men were not just interrogators and writers, but 
were knowledgeable and valuable assets in the creation of cases against the war criminals 
and also in the efforts towards restitution.  
The ALIU issued its Final Report on May 1st, 1946 from the Washington D.C. 
office.11 This report include an outline of the history of the unit, an index of reports 	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created, the problems that remained outstanding, recommendations for further actions, 
and a biographical index of individuals involved in art looting.12 This document proves to 
be invaluable in judging the effectiveness of the unit because it clearly outlines what was 
accomplished in each section of Europe where the individual men worked. It also lists the 
suggestions of elements they feel still need to be investigated. The first chapter of the 
document outlines the basic formation of the program and the mission statement that they 
followed through out their time in Europe; the information presented here is identical to 
what had been present in their reports to other government agencies and operatives 
during the war.13 The next section of the report proves to be more useful because it 
outlines the activity of the ALIU operatives in the field and gives further information into 
what they had been doing during periods that were glossed over by their progress reports.  
There are other countries mentioned in this initial section of the report but they 
were more obviously explained in either the progress reports or in the Interrogation 
Reports. The Final Report served as a summary of the accomplishments of the ALIU and 
especially outlined the elements to their investigation that had not been highlighted in 
their larger reports. This document might have also included information that could not 
have previously been released because of its classified status; there is no way to prove 
this fact but it is one possible explanation for why these elements to the investigation had 
not been explained in previous documents.  
The report then moves on to a discussion of the problems facing the ALIU men 
and their investigation; because their investigations would lead to the reparation of art it 
was still an active and ongoing investigation even if the men were no longer interrogating 	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suspects. The major problem facing the men during the war, as stated in the report, was 
the limitation of both time and manpower.14 In regards to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, the 
major activities had been discovered and presented in the Consolidated Report, but there 
was evidence that there had been clandestine disposals of art that had been used for 
personal gain.15 This is just one of the many example of information and questions that 
were discovered during interrogations that were left unanswered because of the lack of 
time allotted to the ALIU unit.  
When developing a list of individuals the ALIU would interrogate, Josef Angerer 
was included; however, the ALIU was not able to conduct this interrogation because 
Angerer was released from Allied custody prematurely.16 This caused problems for the 
ALIU investigation because he was very active in German art looting and would have 
been able to shed on the following issues: German art looting immediately after the 
France-German armistice; the methods as well as volume of furniture tapestries and 
decorative art confiscated for the Goering Collection; the purchasing activity in Italy on 
Goering’s behalf; and finally Angerer’s role in the Goering operation would have become 
more clear.17 Due to their timetable, the men were restricted in the number of individuals 
that they could interrogate. This meant that the ALIU was not able to get the full picture 
of what was happening in every section of the German art-looting machine. For this to be 
fully explored, a much larger team, probably close to the size of the MFAA, would have 
been required as well as unlimited time.  
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The final issue addressed in this report was the fact that the outline of the policies 
created by the Germans regarding the acquisition of art of the Linz museum was not 
made available until after the report was released.18 Throughout his report, Faison was 
forced to rely on the testimony of the men who worked inside the organization; by seeing 
the official rules put into place, the entire operation and the intention’s of its leaders 
would have been more completely understood. These were the major questions that were 
left in the minds of the ALIU men as they departed Europe. With more time in the field it 
is likely they could have resolved most, if not all, of these questions and problems. There 
were areas, such as German looting in the East that was left completely unexplored 
because of the lack of access and manpower to conduct investigations.19  
The Final Report is concluded with a discussion of the recommendations outlined 
by the ALIU men for further action in Europe.20 The authors of the document appear to 
feel that is was obvious that there needed to be continued investigation done before the 
case of German art looting could be closed.21 Furthermore, because of their close 
collaboration nature of the work being done during the war between the American 
government and the British, French, Swiss and Dutch governments, they were going to be 
forced to stay continually involved even after the duties of the ALIU were completed.22  
Following the completion of both the Interrogation Reports and the Final Report, 
the majority of the work assigned to the ALIU was completed. In April of 1946 Walter 
Surrey, who was a member of the Division of Economic Security Controls of the State 
Department stated that it was highly recommended that the ALIU men remained present 	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in Europe “for the next few months…this will not only expedite current work of this 
Division but will also enable the project to be concluded in an orderly manner, 
satisfactory to the Governments concerned”.23 The director of the program agreed with 
this and felt that one member of the ALIU should conduct a final mission through 
Europe; during this mission, it was hoped that the ALIU operative could make final 
conclusions about the state of the various countries, their efforts towards restitution but 
also to meet with the governments to advice them in the next steps that were required.24 
Otto Wittmann was chosen to conduct this final investigation and it was decided that he 
would visit France, England, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark over the span 
of four months.25 
 Like with the ALIU’s initial mission, clear guidelines were set out for Wittmann’s 
mission, because, once again, there was a strict time restriction. The Wittmann was told 
he was supposed to:  
(a) Make a final survey of the remaining problems connected with enemy looting 
of art (b) to arrange with other U.S. Government agencies (Military Government 
in Germany and State Department in other areas) to continue investigation and 
controls initiated by the unit (c) to confer with agencies of certain foreign 
Governments, who have also been working on the problem of art looting (d) to 
survey the extend of continuing traffic in looted art and (e) to undertake certain 
concluding investigations of problems connected with looting art.26  
 
This information was to be collected on a country-by-country basis and be organized into 
a final document that would be widely distributed.27 
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 France was the first country to be visited by Wittmann; he stated that throughout 
the summer he had returned to this location from time to time because of its distinction as 
the base of operations for much of the looting activity.28 Following the completion of the 
war, it remained important that the French Government and their agencies continued to 
have a positive liaison relationship with the United States.29 When in France, Wittmann 
met with Albert Henraux who explained the current status of the French restitution 
efforts.30 By the time this report was written, the majority of objects, which had been 
taken by the Germans, had been returned to the French by the MFAA.31 At this point, the 
French were continuing to track down and apprehend German nationals who were 
connected to the art looting effort in France; this is where he told Wittmann they still 
needed assistance.32 In addition to this investigation, other French representatives asked 
for the cooperation of the United States so that they could continue to conduct 
investigations in the American Zone in Germany (attachment 3); they felt that this 
investigation would help in the discovery of the French objects and pieces of art that were 
still missing.33 
 In their recommendations for the future of the individuals interrogated by the 
ALIU, there was one case in which it was decided that the individual would be sent into 
French custody and they would conduct the trial. The French, they set up what had come 
to be known as the “Seine Tribunal”; they were given the task of investigating the 
individuals in their custody, indicting them and then conducting the prosecution.34 This 	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tribunal was reserved for those being charged as “French collaborationist art dealers”.35 
Strict protocol was followed when dealing with these cases; first a judge was required to 
determine whether the evidence held against the individual in question was to be 
considered incriminating.36 If the individual was guilty but their activity did not warrant a 
formal trial, they would be sent to the Comite d’Epuration Artistique Interprofessionelle, 
which had the power to ban an individual from future participation in trade.37 If the case 
being brought against the individual was so severe, they would then be send to the French 
Criminal Courts where they would stand for trial.38 Gustav Rochlitz was the individual 
interrogate by the ALIU who would be sent into French custody. In the Appendix to 
Wittmann’s report, Rochlitz is not listed as one of the men to have already been brought 
to the Seine Tribunal; it is possible that he had not yet been tried or they had sent him to a 
different court.39  
Wittmann is harsh in is assessment of the French government and their ability to 
create a unit that would take over the responsibilities of the ALIU. In his conclusion, he 
states that the majority of objects taken during the war had been returned but the 
government wanted to continue investigating those that were still missing.40 The problem 
that arises, in Wittmann’s opinion, is that the French had yet to find a way to use the 
extensive documentation provided to them by American and Allied agencies in a 
successful manner.41 In addition they were working slowly to come up with their own 
organization; this was allowing dealers who had collaborated with the Nazis to continue 	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their business practices as if nothing had changed.42 The major fear left in the minds of 
many of the French officials, and what Wittmann completes his report with, was that the 
dealers had already been able to transfer looted items to the United States.43 The concern 
will be present for the majority of the countries discussed in this report.  
England was the next country to be visited by Wittmann; here he found that the 
British government had almost completely dissolved the units created to investigate art 
looting, except for the section of the MFAA.44 Before leaving London it had been 
decided that a central international file for the information regarding art looting during 
the war would be the most effective method of storing the information that was 
accumulated.45 This file would include lists of persons who were active in art looting 
during the war, catalogues of art objects that were still missing, and as many 
photographic files as they could find of works that should be classified as stolen.46 It was 
important that this information was protected and kept in an organized manner because it 
was suspected that much of the missing art would stay off the markets for at least ten 
years before it resurfaced in the market.47  
Wittmann explains that it was assumed during this period that high value pieces 
would only be put on the market when it appeared that the active investigation into the 
recovery of the art had ceased; Kurtz explained, in his book on this topic, much of the art 
did not surface until the dealers and collectors active during this period began to die.48 
Since this project would be a demanding long term commitment, it was decided that it 	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could not be completed by any individual country; because of this, it was suggested that 
their be an international agency created which would be the “clearing-house” for this 
information.49 This discussion seems to be very similar to the one that led to the creation 
of the ALIU; it had been clear that the individual European countries were not effective 
in their investigations and they needed an agency that would be able to focus solely on 
the mission in order for it to be effective. The ALIU was the central location where all 
information could be sent and where it was most likely information could be found 
regarding the looting machine.  
Switzerland was the country that had the most unsolved elements to their 
investigation into the enemy looting of art during the war. Both the MFAA and ALIU had 
worked to recover art stolen from the Swiss and also apprehend the individuals 
responsible but they were not successful.50 In discussions between the Swiss and 
American governments, it was decided that the Swiss would continue their investigation 
into the art looting and art transactions that took place during the war; this investigation 
had been started by the British and the ALIU but due to the time restraints had to be 
passed on to the Swiss government.51 In February of 1946, a census was taken of all 
works that had been looted during the war by the Germans; in addition, the Swiss 
government sent out a decree that stated that any art that had a doubtful provenance must 
be reported to the government.52 Both of these efforts proved useless, because none of the 
important objects, which had likely been looted, were found.53 Like in France, the Swiss 
dealers who worked with Nazis were continuing to work following the war in; it is likely 	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52 Ibid, 12. 
53Ibid, 12. 
	   79	  
that they were finding ways to traffic stolen art into France, Holland and the United 
States.54 
 In regards to the recovery and return of looted pieces of art, the Swiss government 
was holding a strictly neutral stance, and they took very little action to recover their 
assets.55 There were seventy-six paintings included on a list created by the Allies which 
they believed were stolen from Switzerland during the war. These works were taken in by 
the Swiss and kept at the Berne Museum; they would be held there until it was 
determined how restitution would be handled.56 These works, which were brought to the 
attention of the Swiss by American and British forces, were the only pieces to be 
recovered up to that point.57 From this report, it appears that the Swiss government was 
either not able to provide the resources to attack the problem of finding art that was 
looted or that had more pressing issues to resolve. Whatever the case, they seem to have 
stalled and the creation of an international organization, like the one discussed in 
England, would proved helpful.  
 Wittmann visited Germany in the summer of 1946 twice; the first time was to 
meet with the MFAA section that was working to expand the intelligence organization 
regarding art that was looting.58 This effort was intended to incorporate much of the work 
that had been completed by the ALIU; because of this, the MFAA wanted to maintain 
close contact with the ALIU men for as long as the program remained in tact.59 During 
this trip it was also proposed that the MFAA work to develop a more extensive program 
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that would investigate looted art; this operation had originally been conducted by one 
individual and now would be expanded to a Chief Investigator, a Research Assistant and 
an additional Investigator.60 In addition, it was decided that closer relationships and better 
communication should be held between the various MFAA groups that were working in 
the American Zone.61  
 When in Germany, Wittmann was asked to consult because of the ALIU’s 
primary focus on art dealers who worked with looted art.62 The MFAA intended to use 
the reports created by the ALIU to screen dealers before they were given licenses; they 
set out guidelines that, they hoped, would help control the German dealers who were still 
active.63 These rules stated that all German dealers were required to hold a license, 
dealers who were dealing in objects created before 1850 must provide evidence of valid 
provenance before selling the work, and that dealers could sell all art objects that were 
produced in Germany after 1850 without having to report to the Military Government.64  
 The second time Wittmann visited Germany was to interrogate and prepare a 
report on Hans Wendland.65 Wendland was a German who was responsible for much of 
the looting done in Switzerland during the war.66 He had been interviewed with little 
success by the ALIU previously, but when it was discovered that he traveled to Rome 
during the war, he was arrested and brought to Germany to be interrogated by both the 
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66 Ibid, 16. 
Note: Neutral countries were often used by the Germans to hide their looted art. It was suspected by the 
ALIU that they also stole what they could from these areas as well.  
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MFAA and ALIU.67 It was hoped that Wendland would be able to help solve the many 
questions left unanswered in Switzerland.68 This interrogation shows that even though the 
ALIU accomplished a great amount during their time in Europe, there were still elements 
left untouched and areas where they could contribute further.  
 Sweden was one of the few countries that were not visited by the ALIU during 
their investigations during the war. Wittmann notes in his report that this is surprising 
given that it would have been a perfect location for Germans to conceal their looted items 
because of its status of neutrality.69 While the Swedish government was aware of the 
concerns held by Wittmann, they claimed that there were no great examples of looted art 
assets being found in Sweden.70 The final task that Wittmann hoped to solve while in 
Sweden was to interrogate Alfred Anderson, who was a German refugee art dealer who 
had previously spoken with the ALIU.71 Wittmann could not locate Anderson and thus, in 
his conclusion, state that he should be found and questioned in greater detail regarding 
his actions during the war and his connection to Karl Haberstock (who at the time of the 
creation of this document was being held in custody in the American Zone in 
Germany).72  
 The final country to be visited by Wittmann was Denmark; this was another 
country that was not visited by the ALIU during the war.73 The reason that Denmark was 
not visited was because it was considered unlikely that items looted by the enemy would 
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be kept here.74 The reason for this visit was that when visiting with Swiss government 
officials, it was brought to Wittmann’s attention that there had been reports made during 
the war that suggested art was being concealed in Denmark.75 When meeting with the 
Commercial Attaché of the American Legation in Copenhagen, Wittmann found little 
evidence of any concealment in Denmark and it was known for a fact that the Germans 
stole no Danish art that was of great importance.76 Wittmann concluded that no further 
investigation was needed into the looting activity in Denmark.77 
 In the conclusion of the document, Wittmann states that by the summer of 1946 
between seventy-five and eighty percent of the art that was taken during the war by the 
Germans had been returned to their countries of origin.78 Those remaining pieces of art 
were either still missing or had yet to be identified.79 The majority of the identification, 
safekeeping and return of art had fallen under American jurisdiction because it was found 
in the American Zone of Germany.80 The documents created by the ALIU were used as 
primary documents in the identification of art and personnel involved in looting.81 
 The number of art dealers, collectors and agents who collaborated with the Nazi 
party that were able to return to their business and avoid any serious prosecution, shocked 
Wittmann.82 The United States was the largest market for the sale of valuable art objects; 
this meant that American art dealers and private collectors would be forced to carefully 
screen the art they considered buying for at least the next decade to ensure that they were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ibid, 20. 
75 Ibid, 20. 
76 Ibid, 20. 
77 Ibid, 20. 
78 Ibid, 21. 
79 Ibid, 21. 
80 Ibid, 21. 
81 Ibid, 21. 
82 Ibid, 21. 
	   83	  
not stolen pieces.83 A list had been made between the British, French and United States 
that listed the looted art that was still missing; this list was to be used by customs control 
offices to ensure that stolen pieces of art were not entering the country.84 In addition to 
this list, it was suggested that the Final Report created by the ALIU be used to screen the 
visas of art dealer and art agents entering the country.85 The final suggestion regarding 
the custom’s process was to create an international list of missing looted art objects that 
could be used by all nations to insure that when examining art coming into the county 
that no looted pieces slipped through the cracks.86 
 This was the final report written and produced by the ALIU and marked the end 
of the operation.87 From this time on, the documents that had been in possession of the 
ALIU were transferred to the Department of State, who had a continued interest in these 
matters.88 The success of the ALIU should not be judged based on the number of people 
they interrogated or the number of reports that were created; instead they should be 
judged by the impact they had. The ALIU provide support to countries that were unable 
to accomplish the investigations that were required to prosecute war criminals and for the 
restitution of art following the end of the war. These European governments looked to 
how the ALIU was organized and tried, and often struggled, to create a mimicked version 
of this for their own country. The reports show that even after the ALIU had left Europe, 
they were still being sought after as experts on the art looting organizations that had 
ransacked so many European cities. This document, which provided closure for the 
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program during the time it was written, also is the perfect way to end a discussion of the 
ALIU and their place in history because it outlines the accomplishments of the ALIU and 
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Conclusion: 
 The ALIU was a small unit that was given a large task. When they entered the 
European Theatre in January of 1945 the major battles of the war had already been fought 
and the Allied governments were beginning to make plans for the future of Europe. The 
ALIU worked to prepare documents that could be later used to establish the ownership of 
various looted pieces but they were also able to determine who should be held 
responsible for looting. In comparison, the MFAA men entered the field on the heals of 
the first invaders and were constantly on the frontlines of the war rushing to get protect 
art and monuments before they were destroyed. This story, while often more adventurous 
and dramatic, should not overshadow the work that was done by the ALIU.  
 Through studying the work of the ALIU men, there is the constant ability to 
compare their work to the work being done by the MFAA. However, the two should be 
treated as two entirely different types of groups. The ALIU worked to collect documents 
and information, while the MFAA collected pieces of art. The effect of the MFAA was 
much more immediate because they were bringing treasures back to their homes. The 
ALIU had a much more long term and lasting effect. The men had quickly become 
experts that were sought after by all the Allied governments because of the information 
they had found that would assist in the massive task of repatriation.  
 At first glance it can appear that, since the interrogations conducted by the ALIU 
did not result in any convictions or even trials at the Nuremberg Trial, that their mission 
was a failure. This is not the case. The ALIU men used the interrogations as a way to gain 
insight into the larger organizations. Just because the Allied governments did not follow 
the suggestions laid out by the ALIU men for how the individuals should be handled 
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doesn’t mean they were not respected. It can be assumed that because of the volume of 
individuals facing much more severe charges, they were just a lower priority. The 
information developed by the ALIU did have one contribution that had immediate 
ramifications. Through their many interrogations, the ALIU worked to develop files that 
eventually contributed to the conviction and eventual hangings of Hermann Goering and 
Alfred Rosenberg.1  
 Due to the fact that none of the men interrogated by the ALIU appeared in the 
Nuremberg trials, their fate is not always entirely clear. For those whose actions cannot 
be traced after the war, it is likely that they were never convicted and lived out their lives 
avoiding any further attention from the government; these men were Heinrich Hoffmann, 
Gunther Schiedlausky, Walter Bornheim, Karl Kress and Hermann Voss. Gisela 
Limberger is another individual who did not get any attention following the war, but this 
was expected given her position as a secretary. Even when with the ALIU, she was never 
held against her will but instead volunteered testimony.2  
 For those who can be traced following their interrogations, it appears that they 
were forced to go through denazification; Karl Haberstock was one of these individuals. 
Even after this had been completed, the attorney general of Nuremberg continued to look 
into his actions during the war into the 1950’s.3 While he was able to reestablish his 
business in 1951, many of his colleges as well as many family members cut ties with him 
because of what his actions during the war.4 To avoid public ridicule, Haberstock was 
forced to work out of his private apartment and work at a much smaller scale for the 
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remainder of his life.5 In a final attempt to redeem himself, Haberstock donated a large 
part of his personal library to the Augsburg Municipal Art Museum, and he and his wife 
set up the Karl and Magdalene Haberstock Foundation.6  
 Robert Scholz, Bruno Lohse and Walter Andreas Hofer were not able to escape 
the punishment for their actions as easily as Haberstock. The Parisian Military Tribunal 
tried these three men for “wartime expropriation of artwork in France.”7 Scholz and 
Hofer both refused to attend the tribunal and stayed in Germany to avoid their conviction 
of ten years in jail.8 Hofer chose to stay out of the public eye and waited to revive his 
career until the 1950’s and 1960’s.9 Scholz, on the other hand, rehabilitate his career 
immediately, but was forced to refrain from publishing and was required to stay in his 
hometown to avoid being sent to prison.10 When he did eventually begin to publish his 
writing again in the mid 1960’s, he continually attempted to rationalize, but never 
apologized for, his actions during the war.11  
Unlike Hofer and Scholz, Lohse appeared in front of the Military Tribunal, it is 
not clear whether this was his personal decision or if it was forced upon him. When he 
stood for his trial, he, like the previous two men, was found guilty of being involved in 
expropriation during the war. The influence of the ALIU becomes clear during this case. 
Due to Lohse’s cooperation while being interrogated, the United States government asked 
for leniency in his sentence. Lohse had provided vital information, which led to 
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convictions but also the discovery of stolen art, and because of this he was released from 
his sentence.12  
While the fate of the men interrogated was not determined by the ALIU, their 
accounts were valued when assessing the guilt during the trials following the war. The 
ALIU was able to be successful in their mission because of the support of the OSS and 
United States Army, their dedicated team, and their organized mission. Before being sent 
into the European Theatre initial plans had been established for how the team would 
precede and a very specific mission was outlined. They were able to follow this mission 
and quickly determined which individuals needed to interrogated and how best to locate 
them. The major influence of the ALIU comes from their ability to compile such detailed 
documentation of the looting activities. This information was used, and likely still is used 
today, to track the origin of pieces of looted art. Without the work of the ALIU, the 
process of repatriation would have taken much longer and would not have been done in 
such an organized fashion. Their legacy lasted long after they left the European Theatre, 
and their influence should not be overshadowed by the work done by the MFAA.	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